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Originalism remains a controversial interpretive methodology, but in federalism cases all of the Justices on the
Rehnquist Court appeared to embrace it. Originalism, of
course, presupposes that the Constitution has a fixed, original
meaning. But the nature of a constitution, Chief Justice John
Marshall explained in McCulloch v. Maryland, requires that
“only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects
designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”1 To
Marshall, this was one of the Constitution’s great virtues.2 But
others saw vice. During the debate over whether to ratify the
Constitution, Anti-Federalists charged that the Constitution
was deliberately ambiguous, and that judges, acting under the
guise of constitutional interpretation, would construe it instrumentally to permit expansive federal power.3 Federalists
responded by arguing that the Constitution was a straightforward charter, and to the extent that it—like all written documents—contained ambiguities, they would be resolved by
judges constrained by the rules of “universal jurisprudence”
and traditional methods of interpretation.4 Like any other “new
law[ ],” Madison explained, the Constitution would be “obscure
and equivocal, until [its] meaning be liquidated and ascertained
by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”5
Federalist advocates of ratification and Anti-Federalist opponents thus generally agreed that the Constitution’s generalities would sometimes be given particular meaning in the course
1. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
2. To Marshall, the alternative was not feasible: “A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will
admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution,
would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced
by the human mind.” Id. Worse still, a governing charter that dealt too intimately with details “would probably never be understood by the public.” Id.
3. See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text.
4. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 71 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1937) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (remarks of John Steele at the 1788 North Carolina
convention); THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see infra notes 62–71 and accompanying text.
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229.
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of judicial decision making, even if they disagreed about
whether this was a cause for concern. This early understanding—that the Constitution’s meaning could be “fixed” through
postratification practice—enables originalists to reconcile the
theory that the Constitution’s meaning cannot perpetually
evolve with the reality that the Constitution and the historical
materials to which we look today to discern original meaning
may in fact leave many important questions unresolved.6 Even
if the meaning of a constitutional provision was not fully settled at the time of ratification, it could be fixed by precedent,
and the originalist today is as bound by that fixed meaning as
he would be by the meaning of constitutional provisions that
were unambiguous upon ratification.
In the first decade of the new republic, the most significant
constitutional questions were addressed, albeit not always resolved, in the political branches.7 But the Court had many opportunities to “liquidate” the meaning of the Constitution during John Marshall’s thirty-four-year tenure as Chief Justice. In
the words of David Currie, “[t]he Court under Marshall had a
unique opportunity to put meat on the largely bare bones of the
Constitution.”8 The most significant opinions during Marshall’s
tenure represented a “vigorous affirmation of national authority and of vigorous enforcement of constitutional limitations on
the states.”9 His Court announced a sweeping view of Con-

6. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519, 555–56 (2003) (discussing several questions on which members of the founding generation disagreed and which remain unclear today).
7. The most prominent examples are the debate over whether Congress
has power to create a national bank, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1901, at 36–41 (1997), whether
the President has inherent authority to remove an executive officer, see id. at
78–80, and whether the House of Representatives has authority to decline to
appropriate funds for the execution of a treaty, see id. at 211–22. The Court
did issue some important decisions during that time. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 393–94 (1798) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibits only retroactive criminal laws); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236–37 (1796) (holding that the Court had authority
to invalidate a state law for unconstitutionality); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419, 425 (1793) (holding that the Court had jurisdiction to hear an
original action in assumpsit against the State). But for the most part, “[i]n the
twelve years of its existence before the appointment of John Marshall as Chief
Justice, the Supreme Court had decided few significant constitutional questions.” DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 127 (1985) [hereinafter CURRIE, SUPREME COURT].
8. CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 62–63.
9. Id. at 62.
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gress’s incidental powers under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, in the course of upholding the legality of the Bank of
the United States;10 first suggested the existence of a dormant
Commerce Clause as a limitation on state regulatory authority;11 affirmed the Court’s authority to review state court decisions denying federal rights;12 asserted federal jurisdiction over
suits against state officers;13 broadly construed Article III federal question jurisdiction;14 and narrowly construed the States’
immunity from suit in federal court.15
The Marshall Court’s assertive nationalism poses a challenge to the modern originalist. Justice Scalia, for example, has
repeatedly asserted that the Constitution should be interpreted
as it was understood when it was drafted and ratified,16 and
has criticized those who have interpreted it according to the different meaning that subsequent generations have ascribed to
it.17 However, as I have recently explained, Justice Scalia’s
opinions in federalism cases make clear that his understanding
of the original understanding rests more heavily on the views of
founding-era Anti-Federalists than on the views of the more
nationalist Federalists, such as Alexander Hamilton or James
Wilson.18
What, then, is Justice Scalia to make of the decisions of the
Marshall Court, many of which were in tension with the more
narrow view of federal authority that found currency among
Anti-Federalists at the time of the ratification, and among Jef10. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
11. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 37–47 (1824).
12. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 410–11 (1821); Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 327–31 (1816).
13. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 867
(1824).
14. Id. at 738.
15. Id. at 847–58; Cohens, 19 U.S. at 405–12.
16. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 849, 854 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism].
17. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3,
44–45 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts];
Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 854.
18. See Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of
the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 217–21 (2004);
see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997); Blatchford v.
Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779–86 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29–45 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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fersonian Republicans at the time of Marshall’s tenure on the
Court? After all, the original understanding appears to have
been that the answers to questions left unresolved by the Constitution, or not anticipated at the time of ratification, could be
fixed in the course of subsequent adjudications. Moreover, Justice Scalia himself appears to have embraced this understanding as a way to reconcile the theory that the Constitution has
an unvarying, fixed meaning with the reality that the Constitution was, at least at the founding, filled with ambiguity.19 To
the extent that the significant questions addressed by the Marshall Court truly had been “obscure and equivocal”20 at the
time of the ratification, the Marshall Court’s resolution of those
questions supplied a fixed meaning.
The decisions of the Marshall Court pose a dilemma for the
modern originalist. Discounting the significance of Marshall
Court decisions—in order to declare an original understanding
that is more solicitous of the views of framing-era opponents of
the Constitution—risks infidelity to the original understanding
of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved. However,
accepting the nationalist implications of decisions of the Marshall Court, and thus remaining faithful to the original understanding of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved,
risks undervaluing the views of Anti-Federalists in the quest to
define the original understanding.
Originalism thus appears to tug the originalist in two opposite directions. On the one hand, an originalist who, like Justice Scalia, believes that the Constitution was not originally
understood to confer broad power on the federal government,
can discount the nationalistic decisions of the Marshall Court
on the ground that they are simply inconsistent with the original understanding.21 In other words, the originalist can assert
that the questions resolved by the Marshall Court were in fact
not left “obscure and equivocal” by the Constitution, and that
the Marshall Court simply answered them in a manner inconsistent with the original understanding. The originalist who
takes this view must still decide whether to follow decisions of
19. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (“Because there is no constitutional
text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the [plaintiffs’] challenge
must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of
the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”); Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. at 29–45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229.
21. See infra notes 225–38 and accompanying text.
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the Marshall Court, but only because of the command of stare
decisis, not because of the command of originalism itself.
On the other hand, the originalist who is skeptical of broad
federal power may nevertheless be compelled by originalism itself to accept even the expansively nationalistic decisions of the
Marshall Court. To the extent that one cannot plausibly argue
that all of the questions addressed by that Court were clear at
the time of the ratification, the original understanding appears
to demand the conclusion that the answers to those questions
and any others necessary to the reasoning were fixed by the
Marshall Court’s decisions—even if they would have been resolved differently had, say, Roger Taney or Salmon Chase been
Chief Justice rather than John Marshall.
How did the members of the Rehnquist Court actually
treat the decisions of the Marshall Court in federalism cases?
For this Article, I reviewed every federalism decision since
1970 to determine whether the Justices who generally constituted the majority in federalism cases treated decisions of the
Marshall Court differently than did the frequent dissenters in
such cases.22 I considered both the frequency of citation to Marshall Court decisions and, in those instances in which there
were references to Marshall Court decisions, the purpose for
which the decision was cited. When the Justices did cite decisions of the Marshall Court, I attempted to consider both the
substantive points of law for which the decisions were cited and
the fidelity of the use of the decision to the original implication
of the Marshall Court opinion.
The study reveals that in federalism cases, the Justices in
the majority were significantly more likely than the dissenters
to ignore federalism decisions of the Marshall Court altogether,
whereas the dissenters were far more likely to premise arguments about the original understanding on Marshall Court decisions. When the Justices of the majority did rely on Marshall
Court decisions, they were substantially more likely than the
dissenters to cite qualifying statements about the limited scope
of federal authority. The dissenters, in contrast, were considerably more likely to rely on the more expansive nationalistic
implications of Marshall Court decisions.
The results of the study demonstrate that the Justices,
while professing fidelity to the principles of originalism, did not
robustly, or at least consistently, adhere to the original under22. See infra Part II.B.2.
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standing of how constitutional ambiguities would attain fixed
meaning through adjudication. More important, the study has
implications for originalism as a methodology of constitutional
interpretation. Proponents of originalism contend that originalism minimizes the risk of judicial instrumentalism more effectively than other methods of constitutional interpretation.23
The study suggests, however, that this justification for originalism is overstated. By relying explicitly or implicitly on the
vague distinction between holdings and dicta to temper (or invigorate) the doctrine of constitutional ambiguities, a Justice
can ignore (or accept) pronouncements of the Marshall Court
according to how well they correspond to the Justice’s own conception of the original understanding or to the Justice’s own instrumentalist goals.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets the context,
by providing an overview of originalism as an interpretive
methodology, and then explaining ratification-era views of how
constitutional ambiguities would be resolved. Part II provides a
brief history of Marshall’s elevation to the Court and of the
Court’s federalism decisions during his tenure. It then presents
the findings of the study, which show that there is a demonstrable difference in how the members of the federalism majority and the dissenters treated decisions of the Marshall Court.
Finally, Part III addresses some of the implications of the disagreement over the extent of the binding force of decisions of
the Marshall Court.
I. ORIGINALISM AND THE ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDING OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITY
The Rehnquist Court led a federalism revival, often (albeit
by a narrow majority) favoring the States over the federal government in disputes involving the Constitution’s allocation of
authority.24 Although the Court did not follow one consistent
23. See, e.g., Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 863; see also Scalia,
Common-Law Courts, supra note 17, at 41–47.
24. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas typically voted to uphold claims of state sovereignty, and Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer generally dissented. Indeed, federalism
cases decided by the Rehnquist Court after Justice Breyer’s appointment most
often produced this identical line-up in 5-4 decisions against the challenged
assertion of federal power. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Coll. Sav.
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methodology in deciding federalism cases, it often employed
originalism in seeking to resolve contemporary problems of federalism. To appreciate the role of decisions of the Marshall
Court in conducting such an inquiry, it is necessary to understand both originalism and the various original understandings
of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved.
A. ORIGINALISM AS A METHOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation that
assigns dispositive weight to the original understanding of the
Constitution or the constitutional provision at issue. Originalism requires that a provision of the Constitution be interpreted
as it was understood when it was drafted and ratified, not according to the different meanings that subsequent generations
have ascribed to it. Originalism therefore requires reference to
framing- or ratification-era understandings to determine the
meaning of the Constitution today.25
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). However, there were some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.
Ct. 2195 (2005) (Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer in holding that Congress has power to regulate the
purely local cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana); Tennessee v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509 (2004) (Justice O’Connor joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor
joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in holding that the
Family and Medical Leave Act validly abrogates the states’ sovereign immunity); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Justice Kennedy joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in holding that the
states lack power to restrict the number of terms federal representatives may
serve). The pattern of 5-4 decisions was substantially the same during the first
eight years of William H. Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468
(1987). The only notable exceptions before Justice Breyer’s appointment were
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), in which Justice White
cryptically joined a plurality of four Justices to hold that Congress had authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), in which Justice
Souter added a sixth vote in favor of the State’s claim. The Court overruled
Union Gas in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
25. This description of originalism may be deceptively simple, as there is
disagreement among originalists over the role of constitutional text, Framer
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Of course, as the most prominent adherents of the view
concede, “[t]here is plenty of room for disagreement as to what
original meaning was, and even more as to how that original
meaning applies to the situation before the court.”26 In addition, although some originalists appear to seek answers to constitutional questions by simply asking, “How would the originals have answered this question then?,”27 more nuanced
approaches to originalism aim to “preserve original meaning,
not just in the original context but as applied in the current context,”28 through a process of what Lawrence Lessig has called
“translation.”29 At bottom, however, originalists agree that the
meaning of the Constitution does not change to suit modern
preferences; its contemporary meaning is its original meaning.
The principal conventional defenses of originalism fall into
two categories: “social-contractarian” defenses and “judicialconstraint” defenses. The social-contractarian defenses hold
that “judges may displace legislative decisions in the name of
the Constitution, but only because the Constitution is a social
contract to which consent was validly given through ratification.”30 Contractarian views, in turn, “imply originalist . . . interpretation by the judicial branch,” because it would
be impossible to enforce the bargain struck by the people without reference to their understanding of the bargain.31
intent, and other arguably relevant considerations. See Richard S. Kay,
“Originalist” Values and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y, 335, 336–40 (1996); Smith, supra note 18, at 226–28.
26. Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 17, at 45; accord ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
163 (1990).
27. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171
(1993). Lessig refers to this approach as “one-step fidelity,” and cites the writings of Robert Bork as an example. See id. at 1183 (citing BORK, supra note 26,
at 144). This approach fails, Lessig argues, because “although sensitive to the
effects of context upon meaning in the original context, it is blind to the effects
of context upon the application meaning in the application context.” Id. at
1189.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 1173; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings:
Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 396–401 (1995); Lawrence Lessig,
Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 144–
68; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 140–62 (1991);
Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1998).
30. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997).
31. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1998); see also Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism
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The “judicial-constraint” defenses of originalism posit that
only originalist methodology effectively limits the ability of unelected judges to impose their own views under the guise of
constitutional interpretation. Stated simply, if constitutional
meaning is fixed by an understanding ascertainable by conventional historiographic methods—in contrast to an approach under which constitutional meaning is subject to evolving, extratextual norms—unelected judges cannot impose their own
views under the guise of constitutional interpretation.32
Justice Scalia has argued that the “main danger in judicial
interpretation . . . is that the judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law,” and that “[n]onoriginalism, which
under one or another formulation invokes ‘fundamental values’
as the touchstone of constitutionality, plays precisely to this
weakness.”33 Proponents of originalism concede that often it is
difficult to achieve consensus on what the original understandfor Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 (1999); Michael W. McConnell,
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1132
(1998). Social-contractarian defenses rely heavily on democratic theory. Proponents argue that originalism is faithful to both the legitimately and democratically expressed aspirations of the founding generation, see BORK, supra
note 26, at 143; McConnell, supra, at 1132, and current expressions of majority
will through democratic processes, see BORK, supra note 26, at 163; Scalia,
Originalism, supra note 16, at 862. For criticisms of the social-contractarian
defenses of originalism, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13–15 (1991); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 230 (1980); Dorf, supra note 30, at 1796–
800; Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1097–99 (1989); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 710–14 (1975); Stephen R. Munzer &
James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (1977); Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 1108–10 (1998). For a response to these
critiques of originalism, see Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW.
U. L. REV. 226, 227 (1988).
32. See BORK, supra note 26, at 163; Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra
note 17, at 41–47; Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 863; see generally
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 9–20 (1987) (surveying
the evolution of the concept of “original intention” and its role in limiting the
scope of judicial review). The social-contractarian and judicial-constraint defenses are obviously related. Originalists contend that originalism is the only
method of constitutional interpretation that is consistent with the notion that
the Constitution is a form of law, albeit a special kind of law. Like any other
law, the Constitution “has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual
devices familiar to those learned in the law.” Scalia, Originalism, supra note
16, at 854; see also BORK, supra note 26, at 143; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 3 (1980).
33. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 863.
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ing was;34 but they argue that “the practical defects of originalism are defects more appropriate for the task at hand—that is,
less likely to aggravate [this] most significant weakness of the
system of judicial review.”35 The “originalist at least knows
what he is looking for: the original meaning of the text,” not
some broader and more amorphous notion grounded in the
judge’s own views of justice and morality.36
Originalism continues to spark a lively debate in the academy, and the literature is rich with criticisms of the approach.37
On the Court, however, the originalists appear to have prevailed, at least in federalism cases.38 The Rehnquist Court often decided federalism cases by narrow 5-4 majorities,39 but the
disagreement between the majority and the dissent rarely was
over methodology; instead, the debates tended to be over what
the original understanding actually was. To be sure, some dissenting Justices occasionally suggested other methods of identifying the boundaries between federal and state power.40 On the
34. See BORK, supra note 26, at 163; Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at
863.
35. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 863.
36. Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 17, at 45. For critiques of the
judicial constraint defense, see CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE USES OF HISTORY 25–28 (1969); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 498–500 (1981); James H. Hutson, The Creation of the
Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13–
24 (1986); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP.
CT. REV. 119, 122 n.13, 156; Munzer & Nickel, supra note 31, at 1032–33; Paul
L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 77 (1963); Smith, supra note 18, at 281–
86.
37. In addition to the criticisms specific to the social-contractarian and
judicial-constraint defenses, a frequent attack on originalism is that it purports to assign clear meaning to a document that is indeterminate with respect to many questions, particularly at a high level of specificity. See JACK N.
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 10 (1996); Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 115, 122; Paul Finkelman, The
Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 352–55 (1989); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of
Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669,
695–98 (1991); Smith, supra note 18, at 284–86.
38. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); id. at 760–814 (Souter,
J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); id. at 76–100
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 100–85 (Souter, J., dissenting); U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); id. at 845–926 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
39. See supra note 24.
40. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976–77 (1997) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (discussing European views of federalism).
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whole, however, the debate in the Court’s later federalism cases
was waged on originalist terms. The consensus on the Court
about the propriety of originalism in federalism cases provides
an opportunity to assess how originalism has been deployed in
practice.
B. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF HOW CONSTITUTIONAL
AMBIGUITIES WOULD BE RESOLVED
1. Fixing Constitutional Meaning
Even originalism’s stoutest advocates concede that it is
easier to state the originalist’s task than to perform it.41 The
difficulty stems in large part from the nature of the framing
and ratification of the Constitution. The Constitution proposed
by the delegates to the Philadelphia convention directly addressed many of the thorny issues that had threatened the convention with failure.42 In part due to the document’s focus on
lofty questions of government structure, however, the drafters
left ambiguous the answers to many other important questions
that were sure to arise in the young republic. For the system to
function and endure, there would have to be some means of ascribing meaning to the Constitution where its text otherwise
was silent or ambiguous.
There is an obvious tension between the theory of originalism, which holds that the Constitution has fixed meaning that
courts are bound to respect, and the reality of the framing,
which produced a document rife with indeterminacy. To address this tension, originalists have looked to James Madison’s
theory of liquidation of constitutional meaning. As Caleb Nelson recently argued, the originalist can accommodate theory to
reality by accepting the conventional account that the Constitution, to the extent that it was ambiguous, would attain fixed
meaning, in James Madison’s words, “by a series of particular

41. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 26, at 163; Scalia, Common-Law Courts,
supra note 17, at 45.
42. For example, the proposed Constitution guaranteed the states equal
representation in the Senate, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; rejected Madison’s proposal of a congressional power to negative state laws (and a proposal
to authorize coercive military force to resolve conflicts between state and federal law), preferring instead contingent supremacy for federal statutes, see id.
art. VI, cl. 2; and prohibited Congress from abolishing the slave trade before
1808, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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discussions and adjudications.”43 As explained below, by this
Madison summed up the view that constitutional ambiguities
could be resolved through the basic experience of governing in a
constitutional republic—in Congress, in public debate, and in
the courts. To the extent that the Constitution was ambiguous,
Madison hoped that its meaning ultimately would be “settled
by precedents.”44
Relying on Madison’s theory is particularly compelling for
the originalist, because the ratification debates suggest something of a consensus (at least between the warring Federalist
and Anti-Federalist camps) that case-by-case adjudication in
the courts would play a central role in assigning fixed constitutional meaning when the text of the Constitution was ambiguous. The debate was prompted by the proposed Constitution’s
provisions that, if construed broadly or purposively, could result in expansive authority for the federal government and a
diminished sphere of authority for the States. In his essays arguing against ratification of the Constitution, the AntiFederalist “Brutus”45 warned that federal judges, exercising
largely unchecked power, would apply established—and inherently malleable—rules of construction to constitutional ambiguities to permit expansive federal authority.46 Brutus warned
that in exercising this power of construction, the federal courts
would seize on textual ambiguities to give the Constitution
“such a construction as to extend the powers of the general gov-

43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229; see
Nelson, supra note 6, at 527–29, 556; see also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78–83
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4.
44. Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), in 12
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 250 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland
eds., 1979).
45. The Essays of Brutus “appeared in the New York Journal between October 1787 and April 1788, during which time the first seventy-seven papers of
The Federalist also appeared,” and they were “widely reprinted and referred
to.” 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 358 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)
[hereinafter ANTI-FEDERALIST].
46. Brutus reasoned that Article III’s extension of the federal judicial
power to cases “arising under” the Constitution, and its conferral of equity jurisdiction, would authorize federal courts to construe the limits of federal authority, Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 417, 419, and to do so according to prevailing
rules of construction, which would empower them to “explain the
[C]onstitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to
the words or letter,” id.; see also Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 6, 1788,
reprinted in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 437, 440.
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ernment, as much as possible, to the diminution, and finally to
the destruction, of that of the respective states.”47
First, Brutus argued, federal judges would naturally favor
the government that they served.48 Second, the Constitution
provided virtually no checks on the power of federal judges.49
Third and most important, Brutus asserted, the proposed Constitution was filled with provisions that virtually invited federal judges to declare that federal power was limitless. Most of
the provisions that “convey powers of any considerable importance,” Brutus maintained, are “conceived in general and indefinite terms, which are either equivocal, ambiguous, or which
require long definitions to unfold the extent of their meaning.”50 Federal judges inevitably would rely on these provisions—including the Arising Under Clause in Article III,51 the
Preamble,52 the Necessary and Proper Clause,53 and the General Welfare Clause54—to construe the Constitution to “abolish
47. Essays of Brutus No. 12, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 2 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 422, 422.
48. Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra note 46, at 420–
21.
49. Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 437, 437. Brutus assumed that Congress would
have no power of correction over decisions of the Supreme Court construing
the Constitution. See Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra
note 46, at 420; Essays of Brutus No. 12, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788, supra note 47, at
423. Brutus further assumed that in any event, federal judges would effectively control the extent of congressional power over them, by virtue of their
power to declare Acts of Congress void for inconsistency with the Constitution.
See Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, supra, at 440, 442. The
problem was particularly acute, Brutus argued, because of Article III’s protections for judicial tenure and salary. Id. at 439.
50. Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra note 46, at 420–
21.
51. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan.
31, 1788, supra note 46, at 419.
52. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see Essays of Brutus No. 12, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788,
supra note 47, at 424 (“[I]t is obvious [the Preamble] has in view every object
which is embraced by any government.”); Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan.
31, 1788, supra note 46, at 420.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan.
31, 1788, supra note 46, at 420 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause
“leaves the legislature at liberty, to do every thing, which in their judgment is
best”).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see Essays of Brutus No. 12, N.Y.J., Feb.
7, 1788, supra note 47, at 425 (arguing that the General Welfare Clause’s
“most natural and grammatical” reading is “to authorise the Congress to do
any thing which in their judgment will tend to provide for the general welfare,
and this amounts to the same thing as general and unlimited powers of legis-
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entirely the state governments, and to melt down the States
into one entire government.”55
Brutus did not go so far as to argue that the courts would
engage in a transparent power-grab. The more likely course, he
argued, was that judges would “extend the limits of the general
government gradually, and by insensible degrees, and to accomodate [sic] themselves to the temper of the people.”56 His ultimate prediction nevertheless was dire: “The judicial power
will operate to effect . . . an entire subversion of the legislative,
executive and judicial powers of the individual states.”57
More important for present purposes, Brutus’s polemics
reveal that he assumed that courts would construe the Constitution in the same manner that they construed statutes. For
Brutus, this was a reason to oppose ratification, because a court
applying the “rules laid down for construing a law”58 to the
Constitution would surely engage in mischief. In Brutus’s view,
a constitution should be a simple “compact of a people with
their rulers,” with the power of “construction” vested in the legislature; if the “rulers break the compact, the people have a
right and ought to remove them and do themselves justice.”59
But the proposed Constitution was not such a simple compact,
Brutus argued, and its meaning would inevitably be determined by federal judges. Although Brutus was perhaps the
most articulate voice among the Constitution’s opponents, other
prominent Anti-Federalists shared his view that the Constitution was filled with ambiguities60 and that those ambiguities
lation in all cases”).
55. Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, supra note 49, at 441;
accord Essays of Brutus No. 12, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788, supra note 47, at 424.
56. Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, supra note 49, at 441.
57. Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra note 46, at 420;
see also id. at 422 (“This power in the judicial, will enable them to mould the
government, into almost any shape they please.”). Brutus’s critique thus focused on the two principal Anti-Federalist articles of faith: that the Constitution effected too great a consolidation of power in the national government,
and that the Constitution was fundamentally antidemocratic. See GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 520 (1969);
Smith, supra note 18, at 239.
58. See Essays of Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra note 46, at
419.
59. Essays of Brutus No. 15, N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, supra note 49, at 442.
60. See, e.g., ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE 134
(1964) (quoting remarks of Smilie at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 2
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 243 (remarks of Smith at the New York
convention); 4 id. at 187 (remarks of Caldwell at the first North Carolina convention); id. at 70 (Galloway at the first North Carolina convention); id. at 242
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would be resolved by judges applying the principles of construction generally applied to statutes.61
The Federalists responded by arguing that although the
proposed Constitution had—quite remarkably—produced
agreement on a wide range of divisive issues,62 some ambiguity
was inevitable.63 Such ambiguity was no more fatal for a Constitution, Madison and Hamilton argued, than it was for a
statute. Indeed, “[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and
equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by
a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”64 Accord(resolution of the first North Carolina convention); id. at 34, 50 (Bloodworth at
the first North Carolina convention); id. at 54, 65, 68 (Spencer at the first
North Carolina convention); 3 THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS, IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
164 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827–1830) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES (1827
ed.)] (remarks of Bloodworth at the first North Carolina convention); Letters of
Centinel No. 2, FREEMAN’S J. (Philadelphia), 1787, reprinted in 2 ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 143, 147.
61. See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES (1827 ed.), supra note 60, at 164 (remarks of
Bloodworth at the first North Carolina convention); HERBERT STORING, WHAT
THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 54 (1981); Address of a Minority of the
Maryland Ratifying Convention, MD. GAZETTE, May 6, 1788, reprinted in 5
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 92, 95; Essays by Cincinnatus No. 2,
N.Y.J., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 6 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 10, 12;
Letter from Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams (Jan. 5, 1788), reprinted in 15
JOHN P. KAMINSKI & GASPARE J. SALADINO, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 263, 265 (1984); Letters from the
Federal Farmer No. 4, COUNTRY J. (Poughkeepsie, N.Y.), Oct. 12, 1787, reprinted in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 245, 248; The Address and
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their
Constituents, PA. PACKET AND DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in
3 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 45, at 145, 154–57.
62. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 230
(“The real wonder is that so many difficulties should have been surmounted,
and surmounted with a unanimity almost as unprecedented as it must have
been unexpected.”).
63. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at
491–93; THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 227–29;
accord Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), supra
note 44, at 250 (explaining that the “exposition of the Constitution” would be a
“copious source” of interpretive difficulties “until its meaning on all great
points shall have been settled by precedents”); see also 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES
(1827 ed.), supra note 60, at 115 (remarks of Theophilus Parsons at the Massachusetts convention) (“[N]o compositions which men can pen, could be
formed, but what would be liable to the same charge [of ambiguity].”);
RAKOVE, supra note 37, at 158–59.
64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229; see id.
NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), at 150; id. NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), at 468;
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ing to the Federalist defense of the proposed Constitution,
“when ambiguities demanded resolution, intervening experience would provide the foundation for determining the course
that the interpretation or revision of the Constitution should
then take.”65
Madison and Hamilton believed that courts would—and
ought to—construe the Constitution according to the same
principles of interpretation on which they relied to construe
statutes. Their view was a “restatement in somewhat abstract
terms of the old common law assumption, shared by the Philadelphia Framers, that the ‘intent’ of any legal document is the
product of the interpretive process and not some fixed meaning
that the author locks into the document’s text at the outset.”66
In this sense, the Federalist defense of the Constitution was no
different than the Anti-Federalist critique; Federalists and
Anti-Federalists agreed that the courts would construe the
Constitution in the same manner that they construed statutes,
and that in the process the courts would fix the meaning of ambiguous constitutional provisions.
Federalists and Anti-Federalists disagreed, however, over
the desirability—or at least acceptability—of judicial interpretation of the Constitution. The Federalists argued that Brutus’s
account of the dangers of judicial construction of the Constitution was hyperbolic. First, Federalists argued that “[t]he rules
of legal interpretation are rules of common sense, adopted by
the courts in the construction of the laws . . . . In relation to [a
constitution of government], the natural and obvious sense of
its provisions, apart from any technical rules, is the true criterion of construction.”67 There thus was little reason to fear, as
id. NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), at 491.
65. RAKOVE, supra note 37, at 160; see also Philip A. Hamburger, The
Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 306–12
(1989). Even more ambivalent defenders of the Constitution were willing to
overlook the problem of constitutional ambiguity. See, e.g., MASON, supra note
60, at 157 (noting that at the Virginia ratifying convention, Edmund Randolph
observed, “My objection is, that the [Necessary and Proper Clause] is ambiguous, and that that ambiguity may injure the states. . . . But, sir, are we to reject [the Constitution], because it is ambiguous in some particular instances?
. . . [I]ts adoption is necessary to avoid the storm which is hanging over America . . . .”).
66. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 910 (1985).
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 496–
97; see also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 71 (remarks of John Steele at
the first North Carolina convention) (“Is it not a maxim of universal jurispru-

P_SMITH_3FMT

2006]

01/23/2006 04:17:18 PM

THE ORIGINALIST’S DILEMMA

629

Brutus did, that the courts would “find in the Constitution anything shocking or surprising to the ordinary reader.”68
Second, the Federalists, led by Hamilton, addressed the
Anti-Federalists’ contention that the federal courts’ power to
construe the Constitution is fundamentally antidemocratic.
Hamilton argued that the Constitution “is, in fact, and must be
regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law,” and that it
“therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.”69 It was essential that the courts maintain this
power of interpretation over both statutes and the Constitution,
Hamilton argued, because in those cases in which there is an
irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior
obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.70

In other words, the power of the courts to construe the
Constitution does not “suppose a superiority of the judicial to
the legislative power”; it supposes, rather, only that “the power
of the people is superior to both, and that where the will of the
legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that
of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to
be governed by the latter rather than the former.”71
Whereas Brutus and the Anti-Federalists feared that interpretation would lead to a federal government of unlimited
powers, Madison, Hamilton, and the Federalists believed that
legal interpretation was an inevitable—and inevitably innocuous—process that involved the straightforward application of
common sense to text. As Jefferson Powell has argued, many
Anti-Federalists, including Brutus, would have preferred a
compact in the nature of a contract among the States that left
dence, of reason and common sense, that an instrument or deed of writing
shall be so construed as to give validity to all parts of it, if it can be done without involving any absurdity?”).
68. Powell, supra note 66, at 911.
69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 467.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 467–68. Hamilton also responded to Brutus’s contention that
the “real effect of this system of government, will . . . be brought home to the
feelings of the people, through the medium of the judicial power.” Essays of
Brutus No. 11, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, supra note 46, at 417. The courts, he argued, would have “no influence over either the sword or the purse,” and would
have “neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 465.
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no room for disagreement over what powers the States had
ceded; they “assumed the validity of the anti-interpretive tradition’s equation of construction and corruption.”72 But the leading Anti-Federalists, perhaps because they hoped to generate
opposition to the Constitution by arguing that if ratified it
would be construed as a quasi-statute,73 agreed with Madison
and Hamilton that constitutional ambiguities would be resolved through case-by-case judicial interpretation.
Often it is difficult to discern with confidence the original
understanding of the Constitution, particularly as applied to a
specific problem that arises today, because supporters and opponents of ratification offered conflicting accounts of the Constitution’s meaning. In such cases, there are several plausible
accounts of the original understanding.74 In contrast, it is generally easier to identify an original understanding of questions
expressed at a higher level of generality.75 That appears to be
the case here. Federalists and Anti-Federalists were in substantial agreement about the manner in which constitutional
ambiguities would be resolved; one can therefore assert, albeit
with the sort of tentativeness that must accompany any attempt to discern one metaunderstanding from the wealth of
views expressed during the ratification period, that the original
understanding of constitutional ambiguities was that they
would sometimes be addressed—and constitutional meaning
fixed—through subsequent adjudication.
2. Qualifications to the Conventional Account
The risk of oversimplification is great, however, when attempting to discern original meaning. Thus a few important
qualifications to the conventional account of the original under-

72. See Powell, supra note 66, at 912.
73. See id. at 905.
74. One approach, which the federalism majority consistently followed, is
to cite Anti-Federalist concerns about the meaning of the Constitution to demonstrate that the delegates at the state ratification conventions would never
have voted to ratify the Constitution unless it accommodated those concerns.
See Smith, supra note 18, at 259–62. The other approach is to argue that the
Constitution was ratified notwithstanding the Anti-Federalists’ frequently expressed disapproval of many provisions of the proposed Constitution, and that
their statements demonstrated their “understanding” of the Constitution.
Thus, the originalist can argue, Anti-Federalist fears were realized upon ratification. The dissenters in federalism cases on the Rehnquist Court consistently followed this approach. Id. at 262–65.
75. See id. at 284.
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standing of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved
are in order here. First, many during the framing era believed
that adjudication was not the only way to resolve constitutional
ambiguities. Madison, for example, believed that Congress’s deliberations could “liquidate”76 and fix meaning as well. During
the debate over the President’s power to remove an executive
officer, for example, Representative Madison acknowledged
that “in the ordinary course of government . . . the exposition of
the laws and [C]onstitution devolves upon the Judiciary,” but
argued that in deciding the “limits of the powers of the several
departments,” none of the branches “has more right than another to declare their sentiments on that point.”77 Similar sentiments appear in the debate over whether Congress has power
to create a national bank.78 But even the questions about removal and the bank ultimately were answered—if not permanently fixed—by judicial determination, even as the courts gave
deference to the views expressed by the early Congresses.79
Second, in a series of articles and an important recent
book, Larry Kramer has disputed the conventional account that
the Framers believed that constitutional ambiguities would be
resolved through invocation of the power of judicial review.80
76. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229.
77. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 520 (J. Gales ed., 1789) (remarks of Rep. James
Madison on June 17, 1789); accord id. at 514 (“The decision that is at this time
made [about the President’s power to remove an executive officer] will become
the permanent exposition of the Constitution.”).
78. See, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1954 (1791) (remarks of Fisher Ames on
Feb. 3, 1791) (“The Constitution contains the principles which are to govern in
making laws; but every law requires an application of the rule to the case in
question.”).
79. See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630–31
(1935) (holding that Congress has the power to restrict the President’s power
to remove an official who exercises quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial authority; arguing that the debate in first Congress pertained only to a purely executive officer); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 112–17 (1926) (holding that
the President enjoys the power to remove executive officers, and relying on the
first Congress’s debate over the removal power); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819) (upholding the constitutionality of a law creating a national bank) (“It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity, to assert that a measure adopted under these circumstances, was a bold and plain
usurpation, to which the [C]onstitution gave no countenance. These observations belong to the cause; but they are not made under the impression, that,
were the question entirely new, the law would be found irreconcilable with the
[C]onstitution.”).
80. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES]; Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4
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Kramer argues that the role of the courts in determining constitutional meaning was understood at the ratification to be
sharply limited, at least in cases involving the limits of federal
power.81 He contends that modern originalist accounts of the
courts’ role—at least in policing the boundaries of congressional
authority—are ahistorical, and that the historical record reveals instead a strong preference for “popular constitutionalism,”82 under which ultimate “interpretive authority remained
with the people.”83
Kramer does not deny that “an idea of judicial review had
already emerged before the Constitution was adopted”; he contends, rather, that “the practice that emerged in the 1780s was
not yet well-established or fully developed and, to the extent it
had proponents, was different in kind from what commentators
today . . . mean when they talk about judicial review.”84 Kramer
acknowledges the colloquy between Brutus and Publius, as the
pseudonymous author of The Federalist, about the role of the
courts in liquidating constitutional meaning, but Kramer argues that it was not representative of popular sentiment at the
time of the ratification.85 Kramer also recognizes that the
Framers understood that “a written charter would contain ambiguities and uncertainties and that these would need to be authoritatively resolved.”86 He contends, however, that
Americans at the Founding also believed that such questions could,
and should, be settled by popular and political means, even though
this might entail periods during which some questions of constitutional meaning could remain unsettled and subject to ongoing controversy. Permitting judges to resolve legitimate disagreements about
the meaning of the Constitution would have violated core principles of
republicanism, which held that such questions could only be settled
by the sovereign people. Disputes over what the Constitution meant,
in the Founders’ view, had to be resolved by popular action—whether

(2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Court]; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215
(2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Political Safeguards]; Larry D. Kramer, When
Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387 (2003) [hereinafter Kramer,
Lawyers].
81. Kramer, Political Safeguards, supra note 80, at 232, 240, 287–88.
82. KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 80, at 8; Kramer, We the
Court, supra note 80, at 16.
83. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 80, at 49.
84. Kramer, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 387.
85. Kramer, Political Safeguards, supra note 81, at 246–51.
86. Id. at 237.

P_SMITH_3FMT

2006]

01/23/2006 04:17:18 PM

THE ORIGINALIST’S DILEMMA

633

at the polls; through a process of petitioning, mobbing, and holding
extralegal conventions; or by revolutionary violence.87

It was “the people themselves—working through or responding to their agents in the government—who were responsible for seeing that the Constitution was properly interpreted
and implemented. The idea of turning this responsibility over
to judges,” Kramer argues, “was unthinkable.”88
As I understand Kramer’s project to have evolved,89 it is
not to deny any role to the courts in construing the Constitution
and resolving ambiguities, even in federalism cases. As he concedes, the Framers’ apparent view that politics could settle
constitutional controversies was naïve, and courts are, particularly by modern standards, a “natural choice” to determine constitutional meaning.90 But there is a “world of difference,” he
argues, “between judicial supremacy and judicial sovereignty.”91 Under the former, courts have the “last word” on constitutional meaning; under the latter, courts have the “only
word.”92 “Nothing in the doctrine of judicial supremacy,”
Kramer contends, “requires denying either that the Constitution has qualities that set it apart from ordinary law, or that
these qualities confer legitimate interpretive authority on political actors as a means of ensuring continued popular input in
shaping constitutional meaning.”93
There remains substantial controversy over Kramer’s core
assertion about the courts’ limited role in policing the boundaries of Congress’s power.94 But even accepting Kramer’s ac87. Id.; see also id. at 257.
88. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 80, at 12–13.
89. See Kramer, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 388 (conceding that his critics
are “not wrong to say that I have ‘proved something of a moving target,’ for
coming to understand the historical origins of judicial review has been an ongoing and unfolding process”).
90. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 80, at 13.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Kramer also does not purport to be an originalist. See Larry
Kramer, On Finding (and Losing) Our Origins, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95,
105–06 (2003) (“It makes no sense to address a new problem by resort to an
original blueprint after the design has been modified many times.”).
94. See, e.g., Kramer, Lawyers, supra note 80 at 387–89; see also Norman
R. Williams, The People’s Constitution, 57 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2004). Compare
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980), Jack N. Rakove, Once More Into the Judicial Breach, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 381 (2003), and Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954), with Larry Alexander & Lawrence
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count, there is no fundamental inconsistency in asserting that
the Framers believed that the constitutional ambiguities could
be resolved either through adjudication or through popular and
political means. That Madison believed that congressional deliberation95 or popular action96 could fix constitutional meaning
does not mean that he rejected the notion that the courts could
fix it in appropriate cases, as well. Indeed, his discussion in The
Federalist No. 37 and in other sources suggests that he saw
both as viable means of liquidating the meaning of constitutional ambiguities.97
In any event, at least five Justices appeared unwilling to
accept Kramer’s view of judicial review in cases involving challenges to Congress’s authority.98 To those Justices—and perhaps to the Justices in the dissent, as well99—the doctrine of
judicial review was alive and well in federalism cases. On their
own terms, then, the Justices appeared to embrace—albeit with
strikingly different degrees of confidence in federalism
cases100—the ratification-era belief that the Court would play a
B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005), Bradford R. Clark, Unitary Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319 (2003),
Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 1539 (2005), Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, Questions for the
Critics of Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (2003), G. Edward
White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463
(2003), and John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1311 (1997).
95. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., James Madison, Virginia Resolutions (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 528–29; see generally Theodore W. Ruger, “A Question Which Convulses a Nation”: The Early Republic’s
Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826, 869
(2004).
97. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898 (1997); Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579–80 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
99. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer have asserted that
they are willing to invalidate a statute of Congress on federalism grounds under rational basis scrutiny, even if they seem unwilling to do so under other
judicially constructed limits. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 638
(2000) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.);
id. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
100. Compare Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18 (rejecting the argument that
“Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce” because the “Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local”), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (“Although Justice Breyer argues [in dissent] that acceptance of the Government’s rationales
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significant role in construing the Constitution to liquidate
meaning. And it is on their own terms that I consider their use
of originalism in deciding federalism cases.
Third, Gary Lawson and Michael Stokes Paulsen have offered an account of originalism that rejects not only the Madisonian theory of liquidation through adjudication of constitutional ambiguities, but also the use of precedent itself in many
constitutional cases.101 According to this view, a court can no
more give force to precedent that incorrectly interpreted the
Constitution than it could give force to a statute or an executive
action that is inconsistent with the Constitution. “If the Constitution says X and a prior judicial decision says Y,” Lawson argues, “a court has not merely the power, but the obligation, to
prefer the Constitution.”102 Indeed, Lawson contends, “If the
Constitution is supreme law, it is supreme over all competing
sources of law,” statutory, judicial, or otherwise.103 If taken seriously, this argument would preclude a court today from giving dispositive effect to an earlier decision in a constitutional
case when the earlier decision was inconsistent with the original meaning as discerned today, notwithstanding Madison’s

would not authorize a general federal police power, he is unable to identify any
activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not.”), with Morrison,
529 U.S. at 638 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s “‘substantial
effects’ analysis is not a factual enquiry, for Congress in the first instance with
subsequent judicial review looking only to the rationality of the congressional
conclusion, but one of a rather different sort, dependent upon a uniquely judicial competence”), and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The
practice of deferring to rationally based legislative judgments ‘is a paradigm of
judicial restraint.’ In judicial review under the Commerce Clause, it reflects
our respect for the institutional competence of the Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress’s political accountability in dealing with matters open to a wide range of possible choices.” (quoting FCC v. Beach
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993)).
101. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare
Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and
Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000).
102. Lawson, supra note 101, at 27–28.
103. Id. at 30. Paulsen’s argument is more modest. He argues that although stare decisis in constitutional adjudication is not unconstitutional, neither is it constitutionally compelled. Paulsen, supra note 101, at 1543–51. Accordingly, he argues that Congress has authority to abrogate stare decisis in
constitutional cases. Id. at 1567–99. “The upshot of such a statute would be
that courts would be obliged to overrule a prior interpretation of the Constitution if persuaded that the prior interpretation was incorrect on the merits.” Id.
at 1538.
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theory about the liquidation of constitutional meaning through
adjudication.
There are serious difficulties with this view. The Constitution itself confers on federal courts the “judicial Power,” which
in light of history and context can reasonably be read to authorize reliance on precedent in constitutional adjudication.104
Wholesale abandonment of the doctrine of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication risks not only upsetting reliance interests, but also facilitating judicial about-faces that undermine
public confidence in the legitimacy of the Court’s judgments.
The risk of judicial instrumentalism—which proponents of
originalism claim the methodology minimizes—likely would increase absent the constraining force of precedent. The theory
that constitutional supremacy is inconsistent with a system
that accords binding force to judicial decisions that departed
from original meaning. Moreover, it ignores the possibility that
the Constitution was originally understood to accommodate
and perhaps embrace the use of precedent in constitutional
cases—and Madison’s and Hamilton’s account of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved might be important evidence of such an understanding.105
Whatever methodological or theoretical defects there may
be in Lawson’s and Paulsen’s suggestion, for present purposes
it is sufficient to note that it is not (and surely does not purport
to be) a valid descriptive account of recent judicial practice. Although Justice Thomas has on occasion suggested a willingness
to abandon hundreds of years of precedent in constitutional

104. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 577–81 (2001).
105. Lawson’s and Paulsen’s provocative articles are part of a larger debate
over whether stare decisis and originalism are fundamentally at odds. The
seminal treatment is Henry P. Monaghan’s Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, in which he considered whether it is possible to be a strict
originalist when so much of the Court’s jurisprudence is inconsistent with the
original understanding. 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988). Monaghan suggested
that stare decisis can explain the gap. See id. at 747–48. He argued that, at
least in some important cases, it ought to bridge the gap, and that in other
cases it promotes other values, such as the conception that the law is impersonal. Id. at 752–53. Monaghan’s treatment sparked a lively debate over
whether originalism is consistent with stare decisis. In addition to Lawson’s
and Paulsen’s articles, see Dorf, supra note 30, at 1800–21 (offering an account
of originalism that is consistent with the use of stare decisis), and Fallon, supra note 104 (arguing that stare decisis enjoys constitutional legitimacy because it is widely accepted as such and contributes to the cause of reasonable
justice).
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cases,106 for the most part the Justices accept the binding force
of precedent in constitutional cases.107 Indeed, even Justice
Scalia acknowledges that “almost every originalist would adulterate [originalism] with the doctrine of stare decisis.”108
The final qualification about the account I present here of
the original understanding of how constitutional ambiguities
would be resolved relates to the scope of application of the theory of liquidation, and specifically to the famously elusive distinction between dicta and holdings. Even accepting the account presented here of the original understanding of how
constitutional ambiguities would be resolved, how much of
what the Court says in addressing a constitutional question actually fixes constitutional meaning? The question is particularly important when considering opinions by Chief Justice
Marshall, given his tendency to resolve—or at least offer
thoughts about—questions not necessarily presented in the
cases before him.109
One possibility is utterly conventional: only the holding of
a case can fix the meaning of an ambiguous constitutional provision; dicta, in contrast, have never been binding in the AngloAmerican judicial tradition, and thus could not fix constitutional meaning. If what Madison, Hamilton, and others had in
mind in anticipating judicial liquidation of constitutional meaning was simply that the Court’s holdings would become binding
interpretations of the Constitution, then there is nothing particularly novel about their understanding—other than, perhaps, the suggestion that the courts would in fact have a role to
106. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 610–21 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 585–602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
107. I say “for the most part” because the Court has frequently stressed
that stare decisis “is not an inexorable command,” particularly in constitutional cases. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854
(1992).
108. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 861; accord Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 129, 139 [hereinafter Scalia, Response] (“The demand that originalists alone . . . forswear stare
decisis is essentially a demand that they alone render their methodology so
disruptive of the established state of things that it will be useful only as an
academic exercise and not as a workable prescription for judicial governance.”).
109. See CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 125–26 (describing
Marshall’s decisions as being characterized by “rhetorical flourish, bare assertion, plentiful dicta, multiple holdings, inattention to favorable precedent, and
emphasis on the undesirable consequences of an interpretation at variance
with his own”).
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play in deciding constitutional meaning. But even if Madison
and Hamilton merely expected that constitutional ambiguities
gradually would be resolved according to something like the
common law method, “[t]o slight [certain important statements
in Marshall’s] opinions as dicta, though such they were on a
technical view, is to disregard significant aspects of his labors
and the way in which constitutional law develops.”110
In any event, it is easier to assert that only holdings fix
constitutional meaning than it is to distinguish between holdings and dicta in practice. There is substantial agreement on
the core principle that dicta has persuasive but not binding effect, largely for the reasons offered by Chief Justice Marshall in
Cohens v. Virginia.111 The disagreement is definitional: as Michael Dorf has noted, “we would find a consensus for the judgment that everything that is not holding is dictum and everything that is not dictum is holding, but little in a way of a
substantive definition of either term.”112 Most conventional
definitions of dicta—statements that are not “necessary” to the
decision in the precedent case or, to use Marshall’s language,
that “go beyond the case”—are circular, because the “very issue
in many disputed cases . . . is precisely how far the earlier case
went.”113
Courts and commentators sometimes assert that a statement is dictum if it was not essential to the outcome of the
case.114 This formulation focuses on the facts and the outcome
in the precedent case, and asks which facts were material to
the decision. According to this view, elaborations of legal principle that are broader than the narrowest proposition that
could have decided the case given its particular facts are considered dicta.115 Although frequently deployed in practice, this
110. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69
HARV. L. REV. 217, 221 (1955).
111. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821) (“The question actually before
the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other
principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to
the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.”).
112. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2004–
09, 2040–41 (1994).
113. Id. at 2003.
114. See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS’ REASONINGS 267–80
(1964); Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 18
(1989); Dorf, supra note 112, at 2008–24; Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 162 (1930).
115. Michael Dorf offers as an example Chief Justice Rehnquist’s narrow
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formulation of the distinction between holdings and dicta has
serious potential for judicial manipulation to serve instrumentalist ends, and often results in a patchwork of precedent that
provides little guidance to lower courts and potential litigants.116 The competing explanation of the distinction between
holdings and dicta focuses on the rationale of the precedent
case. Under this definition, courts are bound by statements
that form part of the rationale of the decision in the precedent
case, even if, when viewed from a post hoc perspective, they
were not technically essential to the result.117 Although this
formulation of the distinction between holdings and dicta raises
definitional problems of its own—specifically, there is no neat
way to determine the “rationale” of the precedent decision118—
it is more consistent with the rule of law and a greater obstacle
to judicial instrumentalism.119
If one imports the expansive view of what counts as dicta—
the “facts-and-outcomes” approach—to the context of liquidation of constitutional ambiguities, then early decisions of the
Supreme Court correspondingly will be treated as having resolved fewer ambiguous questions. If, on the other hand, one
follows the rationale-focused approach to distinguishing between holdings and dicta, then early decisions will be treated
as having addressed and presumably fixed a greater range of
ambiguities. At a minimum, the distinction between holdings
and dicta is sufficiently indeterminate that we must be cautious in invoking it as a basis for claims that statements by a
prior Court are not binding, either as a matter of stare decisis
or the original understanding of how constitutional ambiguities
would be resolved.

treatment of Roe v. Wade in his plurality opinion in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 517–21 (1989). See Dorf, supra note 112, at
2007–08, 2030–33.
116. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 53 (1988);
Alexander, supra note 114, at 20, 28–29 (“[R]estricting a rule to the facts of
the precedent case is inconsistent with constraint by precedent.”); Dorf, supra
note 112, at 1999, 2024; Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and
New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 459–76 (1994); Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1979).
117. See Alexander, supra note 114, at 32–33; Dorf, supra note 112, at
2040–48; Monaghan, supra note 105, at 763–65; see also Michael Abramowicz
& Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005).
118. See, e.g, Alexander, supra note 114, at 18 n.21 (listing sources); Dorf,
supra note 112, at 2036 nn.142–43 (listing sources).
119. See Dorf, supra note 112, at 2049–66.
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These qualifications suggest that caution, rather than confidence, is warranted in asserting that the original understanding was that constitutional ambiguities would be resolved by
the Court, which would offer fixed meaning in the course of
case-by-case adjudication. The Court itself, however, appears to
have accepted this account of the original understanding of how
constitutional ambiguities would be resolved, by applying an
originalist methodology to constitutional interpretation (at
least in federalism cases) while following the doctrine of stare
decisis. At a minimum, the Court often treats decisions of the
early Court as entitled to great deference because most of the
Justices of that era participated directly in the ratification debates, and all were members of the founding generation and
thus in a better position to assess the original understanding
than a modern-day judge.120 For present purposes, it is the Justices’ own understanding of the original understanding that is
important, because it is against that understanding that we
can judge their treatment of decisions of the Marshall Court.
II. THE MARSHALL COURT, THE REHNQUIST COURT,
AND FEDERALISM
It is not difficult to see how, in light of both originalism
and the original understanding of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved, decisions of the Marshall Court are
relevant to answering disputed questions of federalism today.
Yet therein lies the tension: whereas the Rehnquist Court was
most often identified with an aggressive defense of state authority, the Marshall Court consistently upheld claims of broad
federal authority while announcing limits on state power.
Moreover, the Marshall Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation was consistent with Madison’s and Hamilton’s
predictions, while simultaneously confirming the AntiFederalists’ fears. As Marshall explained in Gibbons v. Ogden,
“We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers,
other than is given by the language of the instrument which
120. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 856 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (declining to rely on the views of Joseph Story because
he “was not a member of the Founding generation, and his Commentaries on
the Constitution were written a half century after the framing. Rather than
representing the original understanding of the Constitution, they represent
only his own understanding”); cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905
(1997) (“‘contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution . . . , acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions’” (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926))).
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confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which
they were conferred.”121 Marshall’s Court often self-consciously
played the role that Madison envisioned for it, tackling an “obscure and equivocal” document, “liquidat[ing] and ascertain[ing]” its meaning in “a series of particular discussions and
adjudications.”122 This Part first provides an overview of the
Marshall Court’s important federalism decisions and then presents the results of a study of the Rehnquist Court’s treatment
of those decisions in federalism cases.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MARSHALL COURT
President Washington famously warned in his Farewell
Address about the dangers of partisanship, but by the time
Washington left office, the Federalist and Republican parties
had already become rival political forces.123 The principal point
of disagreement between the parties was over the extent of the
powers that the Constitution vested in the national government, and derivatively over how strictly to construe the charter. Federalists continued to apply traditional methods of
statutory construction to the Constitution, which yielded interpretations authorizing broad federal power. In contrast, Republicans, in many ways the intellectual and ideological heirs of
the Anti-Federalists,124 began to warn that “the ‘wiles of construction’ could be controlled only by a narrow reading of the
Constitution’s expansive language.”125 Hamilton, the most eloquent voice among the nationalist Federalists, argued that
“sound maxim[s] of construction” required that the Constitu121. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824).
122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229.
123. The divide was apparent as early as Washington’s first term, when
Alexander Hamilton served as Secretary of the Treasury and Thomas Jefferson served as Secretary of State. The most celebrated disagreement between
Hamilton and Jefferson concerned the constitutionality of a national bank.
Compare Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (1791) [hereinafter Hamilton, Opinion]
(arguing for an expansive definition of federal power), reprinted in 8 PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 119–26 (Harold Syrett ed., 1965), with Thomas
Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (1791) (arguing
for a narrow definition of federal power), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS 416, 416–20 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
124. See, e.g., 4 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON THE
PRESIDENT 25–26 (1970) (noting Jefferson’s distrust of government strength);
Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91
YALE L.J. 1317, 1364 (1982) (noting Jefferson’s goal of limited government).
125. Powell, supra note 66, at 923.
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tion’s affirmative grants of authority be “construed liberally.”126
Jefferson, the most cogent voice among the devolutionist Republicans, responded that “[t]he States supposed that by their
tenth amendment they had secured themselves against constructive powers.”127
Not all of the Federalists were quite as nationalist as Hamilton. By 1800, President Adams had purged his cabinet of
Hamiltonians, and in May of that year he appointed John Marshall, whom Adams viewed as ideologically compatible, to be
Secretary of State.128 But Marshall shared Hamilton’s belief
that a strong national government would be better at the art of
governing129 and would save popular government and the Revolution “from their excesses.”130 In October 1800, one month before the national elections, Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth announced that he planned to resign from the Court because of
his waning health.131 President Adams nominated Marshall on
January 20, 1801, and he was confirmed by the Senate on
126. Hamilton, Opinion, supra note 123, at 105.
127. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (June 12,
1823), reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 146, 148
(Edward Dumbauld ed., 1955); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Gideon Granger (1800), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 30,
30 (Saul Padover ed., 1939) (“[T]he true theory of our Constitution is surely
the wisest and best, that the States are independent as to everything within
themselves, and united as to everything respecting foreign nations. Let the
General Government be reduced to foreign concerns only . . . .”).
Jefferson’s critique of constitutional interpretation ultimately became the
core argument in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which Jefferson and
Madison (at that point a Republican) wrote to protest the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798. See Powell, supra note 66, at 924–27. The resolutions argued
that the Constitution was a contract among sovereign states, which retained
ultimate authority to resolve disputes over its meaning and to strike down
acts of Congress that violated it. See Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions
(Nov. 10, 1798, Nov. 14, 1799) reprinted in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4,
at 540, 540–45; James Madison, Virginia Resolutions (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 528, 528–29.
128. See R. K. NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 141 (2001).
129. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at
174–75.
130. WOOD, supra note 57, at 517. Serving in the militia during the war
made Marshall a nationalist, NEWMYER, supra note 128, at 29, and his subsequent experience in the Virginia House of Delegates convinced him that the
legislature was driven largely by parochialism, id. at 28, 39, 42.
131. GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, 2 THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–15, at 103 n.158
(1981).
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January 27, after the Republicans had swept the Presidency,
the House, and the Senate, but before the transfer of power.132
“Strengthening the federal judiciary, since it was the only
hedge against Republican dominance, was the one subject on
which the lame-duck Federalists could unite.”133 Marshall’s
Supreme Court soon became the Federalists’ only “pocket of resistance to Jeffersonian Republicanism.”134
“[F]ate and ambition made Jefferson president and Marshall chief justice,” and the two men came to “symbolize[] and
personalize[] the competing constitutional persuasions of the
age.”135 Their most famous conflict was over the events that led
to, and the decision in, Marbury v. Madison,136 in which Marshall both rebutted Jefferson’s earlier argument that the States
ought to retain ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution137 and insisted that the executive is bound by the rule of
law.138 After Marbury, Marshall’s Court consistently rejected
the “state-sovereignty and constitutional-compact themes of
Republican constitutional thought.”139 The Court chose instead
to apply to the Constitution the traditional methods of construction that Madison and Hamilton believed were appropriate and that Anti-Federalist opponents of ratification frequently warned would apply.140
132. NEWMYER, supra note 128, at 142, 146.
133. Id. at 134. The Judiciary Act of 1801, which the Federalists enacted
before the Republicans took office, created sixteen new federal circuit judgeships, expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and reduced the number
of Supreme Court justices from six to five, effective at the next vacancy. Act of
Feb. 13, 1801, ch.4, 2 Stat. 89. The Act was repealed by the Republicans in
1802, see Repeal Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132, but by that time Marshall was already on the bench.
134. Powell, supra note 66, at 942.
135. NEWMYER, supra note 128, at 147.
136. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
137. Compare id. at 177–78 (“It is, emphatically, the province and duty of
the judicial department, to say what the law is . . . . So, if a law be in opposition to the [C]onstitution; . . . the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case . . . .”), with Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 19, 1798, Nov. 14, 1799), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra
note 4, at 540, 540 (“[T]his government, created by this compact, was not made
the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself . . . ;
but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common
judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as
of the mode and measure of redress.”).
138. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 172–73 (concluding that mandamus may lie
against the Secretary of State).
139. Powell, supra note 66, at 942.
140. See supra notes 45–71 and accompanying text.
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Marshall and Jefferson clearly disagreed about matters of
federalism, as well, but the Marshall Court did not issue its
most significant decisions on that topic until after Jefferson
had left office.141 During Marshall’s thirty-four-year tenure as
Chief Justice, his Court addressed a wide range of issues related to the powers of the state and federal governments. It is
not my purpose here to explore these decisions in detail, but instead to highlight the most important Marshall Court federalism decisions to provide context for the results of the study.142
The Marshall Court pledged fidelity to the doctrine of
enumerated powers,143 but its decisions on the scope of federal
power expansively defined Congress’s incidental authority and
planted the seeds for later broad constructions of Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce. In McCulloch v. Maryland,144 the Court held, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, that Congress has broad incidental powers beyond those
expressly authorized in Article I.145 The Court also offered a
broad construction of the sweep of the Necessary and Proper
Clause and held that Congress had power to create a national
bank.146 In Gibbons v. Ogden,147 the Court, again in an opinion
by Marshall, defined “commerce” as all “commercial intercourse,” not just the exchange of goods, and thus held that
Congress has power to license vessels traveling between two
states.148 Although the Court conceded that the “completely internal commerce of a State . . . may be considered as reserved
for the State itself,”149 it suggested that Congress may regulate

141. Jefferson appointed three Justices before his second term ended in
1809, and after 1811, only Marshall and one other Justice—Bushrod Washington—were Federalists. Yet decisions of the Marshall Court were almost always unanimous and were almost always written by Marshall. See CURRIE,
SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 196.
142. For a more exhaustive review, see id. at 61–198.
143. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194–95 (1824) (conceding
that the commerce power is limited to that “commerce which concerns more
states than one . . . . The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may
be considered as reserved for the State itself.”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (conceding that the federal government is one
of “enumerated powers” and may “exercise only the powers granted to it”).
144. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
145. Id. at 324–26.
146. Id. at 422.
147. 22 U.S. 1.
148. Id. at 189–90, 204.
149. Id. at 195.
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commerce that merely “extend[s] to or affect[s] other states.”150
This provided a doctrinal basis for the Court’s more expansive
constructions of the Commerce Clause in the twentieth century.151
The Marshall Court was also aggressive in construing constitutional limits on the power of the States. In McCulloch, for
example, the Court held that the States cannot tax or regulate
the activities of the federal government, and therefore invalidated Maryland’s tax on the national bank152—even though,
the Court suggested in dicta, state banks would not similarly
be immune from federal taxation.153 In Gibbons, Marshall suggested that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce is
exclusive,154 laying the doctrinal foundation for the dormant
Commerce Clause.155
The Marshall Court also narrowly construed the States’
immunity from suit. In Cohens v. Virginia,156 Marshall stated
that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude Supreme
Court review of suits commenced by States.157 Marshall also
provided an account of the Eleventh Amendment that is consistent with the narrow “diversity theory” of the provision’s appli150. Id. at 194.
151. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118–29 (1942) (holding
that Congress has the power to regulate the growing of wheat for on-farm consumption).
152. 17 U.S. 316, 431–36.
153. Id. at 435. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that whereas a state tax
imposed on a federal instrumentality falls principally on persons outside the
state—and thus on persons with no electoral control over state decision making—a federal tax would not impose such externalities, because the states are
represented in Congress. See id. at 428, 435. The Court later disregarded the
Chief Justice’s dicta. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 126–27 (1871), overruled in part by Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939)
(permitting nondiscriminatory federal taxation of state government officials’
salaries).
154. 22 U.S. at 209; see also id. at 227–29 (Johnson, J., concurring) (resting
decision on ground that federal power to regulate commerce is exclusive).
Marshall later seemed to retreat from this position. See Willson v. Black-Bird
Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (upholding a state law that
authorized construction of a dam to obstruct a navigable creek).
155. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1043–46
(3d ed. 2000) (explaining the theoretical underpinnings of the dormant Commerce Clause, as expressed in Gibbons). But cf. Norman R. Williams, Gibbons,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1499 (2004) (arguing that Marshall purposely avoided
embracing the dormant Commerce Clause because he foresaw the danger of
allowing the Court to determine such allocations of power).
156. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
157. Id. at 405–07.
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cation.158 More sweepingly, he suggested that Article III’s provision extending the judicial power to cases arising under federal law embraces suits involving States, notwithstanding a
State’s claim of sovereign immunity.159 In Osborn v. Bank of the
United States,160 Marshall’s opinion for the Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit against a state officer,
in part because a contrary interpretation might impede the enforcement of federal law.161 In Bank of the United States v.
Planters’ Bank of Georgia,162 the Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar a suit against a corporation in which
the State is a shareholder.163 Marshall’s justifications for this
conclusion—that the State was not a party, the State was acting in its proprietary capacity, and the State had consented to
suit by giving the bank the capacity to sue and be sued—
suggested broad exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity.164
The Marshall Court also defined the federal judicial power
expansively. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,165 one of the few significant decisions of the Marshall Court that the Chief Justice
did not write,166 the Court held that Congress had power to authorize the Supreme Court to review state judgments, and thus
effectively held that the Court had power to determine the con-

158. See id. at 406–07. According to the diversity theory, the Eleventh
Amendment limited the federal judicial power only when jurisdiction is based
on the Citizen-State Diversity Clause of Article III. See William Fletcher, The
Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (1989); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889,
1936–38 (1983).
159. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 392.
160. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
161. Id. at 847–58.
162. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
163. Id. at 906–08.
164. See also United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 139–41 (1809)
(enforcing over an Eleventh Amendment defense a decree against representatives of a deceased state treasurer).
165. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
166. Justice Story wrote the opinion in Martin after Marshall recused himself because he had appeared as counsel in the case before he was on the bench
and because his family had an interest in the lands at issue. CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 91.

P_SMITH_3FMT

2006]

01/23/2006 04:17:18 PM

THE ORIGINALIST’S DILEMMA

647

stitutionality of state legislation.167 The Court also suggested
that Congress is required to authorize such review,168 although
this view remains highly controversial.169 In Osborn and the
companion Planters’ Bank case, the Court held that Congress
had power to confer jurisdiction over all suits by or against the
bank,170 because the bank’s ability to contract, which was based
on the federal statute creating the bank, “forms an original ingredient in every cause.”171
“[A]t Marshall’s death it could still be said, as in 1789, that
the federal government was neither feeble nor of unlimited
powers.”172 The narrow holdings in decisions of the Marshall
Court tended to be nationalistic, but not unjustifiably so. However, the Court’s opinions more often than not suggested expansive constructions of federal power and corresponding limits
on state authority.
B. THE REHNQUIST COURT’S TREATMENT OF FEDERALISM
DECISIONS OF THE MARSHALL COURT: A STUDY
How have the federalism decisions of the Marshall Court
endured? I reviewed every federalism case decided by the Court
since 1970, shortly before President Nixon appointed William
H. Rehnquist to the Supreme Court, to assess how the Justices
treated decisions of the Marshall Court. I compared the way in
which the Justices who consistently voted to favor state auton-

167. 14 U.S. at 338–49; see also Cohens, 19 U.S. at 387, 391 (extending
Martin to review of state criminal cases). Martin was not the first time that
the Court invalidated a state law. It also did so six years earlier in Fletcher v.
Peck, which invalidated a Georgia law under the Contracts Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810).
168. 14 U.S. at 330–31. For elaborations of Justice Story’s theory, see Akhil
Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 1499, 1501–05 (1990); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 34–35 (1981).
169. Compare Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005–06 (1965) (arguing that Congress need not confer
appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to review decisions of state
courts), with Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953)
(testing the limits of Wechsler’s argument).
170. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823–24
(1824); Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 904, 908–10 (1824).
171. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 824.
172. CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 194.
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omy over federal authority173 relied—or chose not to rely—on
decisions of the Marshall Court with the way in which the consistent dissenters in federalism cases174 treated those decisions.
The study reveals that Justices in the federalism majority were
substantially more likely to discount the nationalistic implications of Marshall Court decisions—or ignore them altogether—
than were the Justices in the dissent, who were significantly
more likely to urge fidelity to the spirit of Marshall Court decisions.
1. Preliminary Matters
First, a note about scope. To review every federalism case
decided by the Court since 1970,175 I needed a workable definition of federalism. Naturally, this required some arbitrary line
drawing. The “federalism” cases that I considered exhibit the
following characteristics: (1) they involved in a direct way176
the extent of the power of the federal government or the state
governments,177 or the boundary between federal and state
173. I have included the following Justices in this group: William
Rehnquist, Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Lewis Powell. Throughout this Article, this group is referred to as “the federalism majority” or simply “the majority.”
174. I have included the following Justices in this group: David Souter,
John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Harry Blackmun,
Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, and Byron White. Throughout this Article, this group is referred to as “the federalism dissent” or simply “the dissenters” or “the dissent.”
175. Although I refer to the “Rehnquist Court” throughout this Article, it
might seem technically more accurate to refer to the “Rehnquist and Burger
Courts,” in light of the temporal range of the cases I considered. I have refrained from using that label, however, because my specific interest is in the
Justices who served (for at least some time) after William Rehnquist became
Chief Justice. The study, in other words, considers how the Justices of the
Rehnquist Court treated decisions of the Marshall Court, but a more complete
picture emerges when we include cases that involved those Justices but were
decided before 1986. In any event, because federalism was Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s signature issue, the bulk of cases relevant to the study were decided after 1986.
176. Many cases indirectly involve the powers of the federal and state governments or the boundary between federal and state power. To take but one
obvious example, the debate over whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the protections of the Bill of Rights was in no small part a debate over
federalism—that is, over whether the Constitution limited the powers of the
state governments in the area of criminal procedure. Such cases turn on an
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which I have mostly excluded
from the study. See infra note 186.
177. I have also excluded several categories of cases that involve limits imposed by specific constitutional provisions on the respective powers of the state
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power; and (2) they required for decision reference to (a) a provision of the Constitution as originally ratified, (b) the Tenth
Amendment,178 (c) the Eleventh Amendment,179 or (d) a principle inferred from the structure of the Constitution. Under this
definition, I reviewed cases involving state sovereign immunity,180 Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce,181
the dormant Commerce Clause,182 preemption,183 federal common law,184 abstention,185 and several other topics.186
and federal governments, because those cases implicate structural principles
or concerns over individual rights that transcend concerns over federalism.
For example, I have not included cases involving the Bill of Attainder or Ex
Post Facto Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 & § 10, cl. 1, or any of the
other provisions in Article I, sections 9 and 10, even though those provisions
expressly limit the powers of the state and federal governments. For the same
reason, I have excluded habeas cases and cases that turn on interpretation of
the Amendments (other than the Tenth) in the Bill of Rights.
178. Although the Tenth Amendment was not part of the Constitution as
originally ratified, it confirmed the theory of enumerated powers, which the
Constitution’s proponents had offered to allay Anti-Federalist concerns about
the breadth of the national government’s power. See, e.g., JAMES WILSON,
SPEECH AT A PUBLIC MEETING IN PHILADELPHIA (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 13
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337,
339 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 327 (“The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”).
179. Although the Eleventh Amendment, which Congress formally proposed to the states for ratification in 1794, was not ratified until late 1797, see
U.S. CONSTITUTION SESQUICENTENNIAL COMM., HISTORY OF THE FORMATION
OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 63 (1941), the Court has held that it
“confirmed, rather than established, sovereign immunity as a constitutional
principle; it follows that the scope of the States’ immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental postulates
implicit in the constitutional design.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728–29
(1999).
180. These cases involve the scope of both state and federal authority. See,
e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (holding that states enjoy immunity from suit in
their own courts); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that
Congress lacks power under Article I to authorize private suits against states
in federal court).
181. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
182. The Court has long interpreted the affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce to imply limits on the power of the
states over interstate commerce. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v.
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571 (1997); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 34–42 (1824).
183. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; California v. ARC America Corp.,
490 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1989).
184. Although limits on the power of the federal courts to develop common
law often are phrased in terms of the separation of powers, the development of
federal common law also raises federalism concerns because of the Supremacy
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As this brief statement about the scope of the study reveals, there is an uncomfortable imprecision in any attempt to
draw conclusions from even a “comprehensive” consideration of
Supreme Court federalism decisions. Even if the question of
scope could be easily resolved, problems would still arise in an
analysis of the Court’s treatment of Marshall Court decisions.
As will become evident, one cannot draw conclusions from the
Court’s treatment of precedent from the Marshall Court without a careful consideration of context. It is one thing when the
dissent relied heavily on a Marshall decision and the majority
declined even to cite it; it is another when both the majority
and the dissent relied on the same decision, each claiming that
it supports its view of the original understanding. In the latter
set of cases, I had to exercise judgment about how to characterClause. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996) (discussing constitutional and
federalism questions raised by federal common law and suggesting that some
federal common law rules are consistent with the Constitution but have been
mischaracterized).
185. Judicial solicitude for “Our Federalism,” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 44 (1971), has led the Court to develop a complex doctrine in which federal
courts abstain from hearing cases “where necessary to promote the integrity of
state law and respect the autonomy of state judicial bodies.” 1 TRIBE, supra
note 155, at 568; see also David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
186. The most conspicuous absence from this list is the Fourteenth
Amendment, which (along with the other Reconstruction Amendments) was
intended to be “a limitation[ ] of the power of the States and an enlargement[ ]
of the power of Congress.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880). I have
excluded most Fourteenth Amendment cases because the Amendment was
ratified more than thirty years after Marshall left the Court. In Fourteenth
Amendment cases, the Court is concerned—to the extent that its methodology
is originalist—with the original understanding in 1868. See id. at 344–45. This
inquiry requires reference to the debates between the proponents and opponents of Reconstruction, and the Marshall Court’s views are at best secondary—even if the Court has borrowed the test from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 321 (1819), in construing Congress’s power to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
326–27 (1966); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345–46. However, I have included those cases that involve the Fourteenth Amendment along with an interpretation of the original Constitution or the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments. Accordingly, I have included cases involving whether Congress has
acted validly pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate
the states’ sovereign immunity, because those cases also turn on an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment and the constitutional structure. See, e.g.,
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). Conversely, I have
not included cases involving Congress’s Section 5 power when the question of
abrogation was not at issue. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
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ize the Justices’ treatment of the Marshall decision. Notwithstanding the fact that subjective judgments sometimes crept
into my analysis at the margins, on the whole it was not difficult to make objective judgments about the manner in which
the Justices of the majority and the dissent in federalism cases
since 1970 cited Marshall Court decisions.187
2. Results
My review of recent federalism cases reveals that the Justices who composed the federalism majority and the Justices
who composed the dissenting voting bloc varied demonstrably
in their treatment of important statements, explications, qualifiers, and outright dicta from Marshall decisions. The Justices
who composed the federalism majority were significantly more
likely than the dissenters to ignore altogether federalism decisions of the Marshall Court. The dissenters, in contrast, were
far more likely to premise arguments about the original understanding on Marshall Court decisions. When the Justices of the
majority did use Marshall Court decisions, they were substantially more likely than the dissenters to rely upon qualifying
statements about the limited scope of federal authority. The
dissenters, in contrast, were considerably more likely to rely on
the more expansive nationalistic implications of Marshall
Court decisions.
Below, I summarize the results of the study by grouping
recent federalism decisions by subject matter and comparing
the ways in which the Justices in the competing federalism voting blocs cited, or did not cite, Marshall decisions. As a primer

187. When the Court in a unanimous decision cited a decision of the Marshall Court, it is equally defensible to attribute the views cited to both the
more conventional majority and dissenting blocs, or simply not to attribute
them to either side. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,
716 (1996) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821), for
the proposition that the federal courts have a duty to exercise the jurisdiction
conferred by Congress). I have chosen the latter path. I have also excluded the
relatively rare cases in which the voting breakdown differs significantly from
the conventional federalism voting pattern. For example, in Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Rehnquist
joined Justice Blackmun’s opinion holding that South Dakota’s policy of preferring in-state cement customers did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. 447 U.S. 429, 446–47 (1980). Justices Powell, Brennan, White, and
Stevens dissented, noting that the “need to ensure unrestricted trade among
the [s]tates created a major impetus for the drafting of the Constitution.” Id.
at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
190 (1824)).
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for the differences in how the competing blocs cited Marshall
Court decisions, consider the way they treated Marbury in federalism cases. Marbury, which was not expressly a case about
federalism, stands today for at least three important, general
propositions: First, the Court has the power, and the obligation
in appropriate cases, to review acts of Congress for constitutionality.188 Second, there ought to be a legal remedy for every
legal wrong.189 And third, the Court has authority to compel an
official of the executive branch to perform a ministerial, legal
duty.190 The Justices in the federalism majority cited Marbury
in federalism cases to support the proposition that the Courts
enjoy the power of judicial review—specifically, that the Courts
retain a role in policing the boundary of the federal power.191 In
contrast, the dissenters cited Marbury in state sovereign immunity cases for the proposition that a State’s violation of federal law, that is, a legal “wrong,” justifies congressional abrogation of the States’ immunity from suit—that is, permits
creation of a legal “remedy.”192 The Justices’ differential treatment of Marbury is emblematic of the way in which they
treated federalism decisions of the Marshall Court.
a. Cases Addressing State Sovereign Immunity
The most pronounced difference between the majority’s
and the dissent’s treatment of Marshall decisions is in cases in188. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–80 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule.”).
189. Id. at 163–66 (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury.”). Of course, there was no remedy for Mr. Marbury. Id. at
166–80.
190. Id. at 166–68 (“[W]here a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear
that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the
laws of his country for a remedy.”)
191. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995); id. at 575,
579 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 243 (1985); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority also cited Marbury’s more specific
holding about the Court’s jurisdiction under Article III to support the conclusion that Congress cannot authorize the Court to hear suits against unconsenting States. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996).
192. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 812 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 54 (1994) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
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volving state sovereign immunity. The difference is stark because, for the most part, the Justices in the majority did not
cite Marshall’s constructions of the Eleventh Amendment at
all. The dissenters, in contrast, regularly relied on Marshall’s
account of the original understanding of both the Eleventh
Amendment and Article III in contesting the majority’s interpretation of the States’ immunity from suit.
The Marshall Court discussion most relevant to recent disputes about the scope of state sovereign immunity is in Cohens
v. Virginia,193 in which Marshall provided a narrow account of
the Eleventh Amendment’s application. Marshall explained
that the Eleventh Amendment’s “motive was not to maintain
the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the nation,” but rather was to bar from federal court a narrow class of
private suits seeking to compel the States to satisfy their
debts.194 He argued that the Eleventh Amendment did not otherwise “chang[e] the relations between the whole and its parts,
as to strip the government of the means of protecting, by the
instrumentality of its Courts, the [C]onstitution and laws from
active violation.”195 Marshall also argued explicitly that Article
III’s grant of judicial power over suits arising under federal law
embraced all suits involving States, notwithstanding a State’s
claim of sovereign immunity.196 However, Marshall’s discussion
on these controversial points was not necessary to the Court’s
narrower conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment did not
preclude Supreme Court review of suits commenced by, rather
than against, States.197
Perhaps for this reason, the majority rarely cited Cohens in
cases defining the scope of state sovereign immunity.198 In
Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation,199 Justice Brennan relied in his dissent on Cohens’s ac-

193. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
194. Id. at 406–07.
195. Id. at 407.
196. Id. at 392.
197. Id. at 405–12.
198. The majority did, however, rebuke the dissent for urging the Court to
overrule Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), in part because the Court in
Hans had “a much closer vantage point than the dissent” for assessing the
original meaning of the Constitution. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
69 (1996).
199. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
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count of the Eleventh Amendment.200 The majority took him to
task for placing “too much weight” on Cohens, because the
statements on which his dissent relied “were unnecessary to
the decision.”201 In the more recent and important decisions in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida202 and Alden v. Maine,203 the majority
did not rely on the relevant passages in Cohens at all.204
When the majority cited decisions of the Marshall Court in
state sovereign immunity cases, it generally cited decisions
that did not involve sovereign immunity. The majority, moreover, typically either cited statements in those decisions that
conceded limitations on federal authority, or relied on statements in those decisions to imply decidedly less nationalistic
consequences than other portions of the same opinions suggest.205 In Alden, the Court cited Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee206—
which held that the Court has power to review state judgments

200. Id. at 507–09 & n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 482 n.11. Justice Powell also argued for the Court that Justice
Brennan erroneously relied on dicta in United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 115 (1809), and Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110
(1828). Welch, 483 U.S. at 491–92.
202. 517 U.S. at 76 (holding that Congress lacks power under Article I to
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity in federal court).
203. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks authority to abrogate
the states’ sovereign immunity in state court).
204. The Court in Seminole Tribe did cite Cohens in a footnote, but it was
solely to support the proposition that the Court “is empowered to review a
question of federal law arising from a state-court decision where a State has
consented to suit.” 517 U.S. at 71 n.14. Cohens did not address the question of
state consent, although the case involved a suit commenced by a State. The
only time the majority cited Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824), in a state sovereign immunity case was in Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe, in which Justice Kennedy interpreted Osborn narrowly to suggest that the Court would not have entertained the suit if a suit against the
State had been available in a state forum. 521 U.S. 261, 272 (1997) (“[I]f it was
within the power of the plaintiff to make the State a party to the suit it would
‘certainly [be] true’ that a suit against state officials would be barred, but if
the ‘real principal’ is ‘exempt from all judicial process’ an officer suit could proceed.” (alteration in original) (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 842–43)).
Justice Souter disputed this reading in his dissent. 521 U.S. at 315 n.12
(Souter, J., dissenting).
205. See Vicki C. Jackson, Coeur D’Alene, Federal Courts and the Supremacy of Federal Law: The Competing Paradigms of Chief Justices Marshall and
Rehnquist, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 301, 321 (1998) (arguing that Chief Justices
Marshall and Rehnquist had “very different visions—of law . . . , of the importance of remedies against government officers for wrongs committed in their
office, and of the relative roles of the state and federal courts in securing the
supremacy of federal law”).
206. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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and determine the constitutionality of state legislation,207 and
suggested that state courts might not be adequate fora for the
resolution of federal questions208—for the general proposition
that the federal government is limited by the doctrine of enumeration.209 The Court in Alden also cited McCulloch v. Maryland210 and Osborn, two decisions generally viewed as announcing broad conceptions of federal power, for the proposition that
the federal government lacks authority to act “through instrumentalities of the States.”211 Similarly, the Court in Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon212 cited Martin for the proposition
that state judges are fully competent to adjudicate questions of
federal law.213 However, the passage cited goes on to caution
that with “respect to the powers granted to the United States,”
state judges “are not independent,” and argues that Supreme
Court review of state decisions is essential because of the risk
that state judges might “unintentionally transcend their authority, or misconstrue the [C]onstitution.”214
On the other hand, the dissent in state sovereign immunity
cases consistently cited both the Marshall Court’s pronouncements on the meaning of Article III and the Eleventh Amendment, and the Marshall Court’s other decisions addressing the
relationship between the state and federal governments. The
dissenting Justices relied on Marshall’s account in Cohens of
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment to demonstrate that it
bars only suits premised on the Citizen-State Diversity Clause
of Article III,215 that Hans was wrongly decided,216 and that the
207. Id. at 343–44, 351.
208. Id. at 334–35.
209. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 739 (1999).
210. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
211. Alden, 527 U.S. at 753.
212. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
213. Id. at 238 n.2 (citing Martin, 14 U.S. at 341–44).
214. Martin, 14 U.S. at 344.
215. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 660 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 112–13 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 508 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 296 n.51 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees of the
Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 313 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 458–59 n.1 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), for the
proposition that the Eleventh Amendment is “not literally applicable” to citizens’ suits against their own States).
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protection of state dignity is an insufficient basis on which to
construct a jurisprudence of state sovereign immunity.217 The
dissenters cited Osborn for the same proposition,218 and Martin, McCulloch, and Gibbons v. Ogden219 for the proposition
that the States are not sovereign, for purposes of immunity,
with respect to obligations validly imposed by federal law.220
The dissenters also relied squarely on other Marshall decisions
in arguing that Article III did not incorporate the doctrine of
sovereign immunity,221 that the Court should construe state
immunity narrowly to allow a broad range of suits against state
officers,222 and that the States do not enjoy the status of full
sovereigns for purposes of immunity under the law of nations.223 Justice Brennan summarized the dissenters’ views
when he argued that the Marshall Court’s “decisions reflect a
consistent understanding of the limited effect of the [Eleventh]
Amendment on the structure of federal jurisdiction outside the
state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses.”224
217. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 770, 772
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 96–97 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
218. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 113 (Souter, J., dissenting); Welch, 483
U.S. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 297–98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
220. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 776 n.16, 800 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)); Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 153 (Souter, J. dissenting) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 410); Welch,
483 U.S. at 514 n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Martin, 14 U.S. at 334–
35); id. at 518 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196–97).
221. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97 n.6 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citing Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812)); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416–18 (1979) (same).
222. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 315 n.12 (1997) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. at 843); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at
172 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. at 738, and United States v.
Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809)); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 92–93 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. at 738,
and Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 124 (1828)); Atascadero,
473 U.S. at 291 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Madrazo, 26 U.S. 110; Peters,
9 U.S. 115); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 143,
148 n.32, 165 n.50 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. at
738, Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806), and Little v. Barreme, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804)).
223. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 500 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)). See generally Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1 (2003).
224. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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b. Cases Addressing the Scope of Congressional Authority
In cases construing the scope of congressional power, the
Justices in the majority regularly cited statements in Marshall
Court decisions acknowledging that the federal government is a
government of limited and enumerated powers. Those Justices
also tended to cite the limiting language in Marshall decisions
that otherwise announced broad interpretations of congressional authority. The dissenters, in contrast, often cited the
Marshall Court’s more expansive constructions of Congress’s
power, and responded to the majority’s treatment of Marshall
decisions by citing Marshall’s narrow construction of the Tenth
Amendment.
Decisions of the Marshall Court often provided something
for everyone, and cases construing Congress’s affirmative powers were no exception. Although the Court in McCulloch and
Gibbons offered expansive interpretations of congressional authority, Chief Justice Marshall prefaced those discussions by
conceding that the federal government is one of “enumerated
powers” and may “exercise only the powers granted to it.”225
The Justices in the majority generally cited only Marshall’s
limiting statements in those cases, not his statements about
broad federal authority.226 Conversely, the dissenters tended to
ignore Marshall’s observations about the enumeration and focused instead on the statements defining federal power expansively and construing the Tenth Amendment narrowly.227
225. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated . . . .”).
226. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936–37 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 553, 566 (1995) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189–90, and McCulloch,
17 U.S. at 316); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 218 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 616 n.7 (2000) (“[T]hat those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the [C]onstitution is written” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803))); Alden, 527 U.S. at 739 (“[The federal
government] can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the
[C]onstitution, and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly
given, or given by necessary implication.” (quoting Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
at 326)); Printz, 521 U.S. at 937 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Marbury, 5
U.S. at 137).
227. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995) (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819), for the
proposition that the Tenth Amendment merely confirms the enumeration);
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 862 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196, McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404–07, and Mar-
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Consider the Court’s later decisions construing Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce, in which the majority
and the dissent sparred over the implications of the decision in
Gibbons. In holding that Congress had authority to license vessels traveling between two states,228 the Court in Gibbons conceded generally that the “internal commerce of a state . . . may
be considered as reserved for the state itself,” but asserted that
commerce “among” the states includes commerce conducted
solely within a state if it “extend[s] to or affect[s] other
States.”229 The federalism majority relied on Gibbons’s limiting
language,230 whereas the dissent cited Gibbons’s broader implications for the scope of the commerce power.231
The majority and dissent also differed in their treatment of
Marshall Court decisions in considering whether there are limits on federal authority implied by the constitutional structure.
The Justices of the federalism majority relied on McCulloch for
the proposition that the constitutional structure implies limits
on the powers of the federal government,232 even though
tin, 14 U.S. at 324–25, for the proposition that “nothing in the Tenth Amendment constitutes a limitation on congressional exercise of powers delegated by
the Constitution to Congress”).
228. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189–90.
229. Id. at 194; see also id. (“Commerce among the States, cannot stop at
the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior.”).
230. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553; id. at 593–96 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbons’s limiting language and offering a narrow construction of Gibbons’s reference to commerce that “extend[s] to or affect[s] other States”); see
also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (citing Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 426, for
the proposition that Congress “cannot punish felonies generally”).
231. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 641, 648–49 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez,
514 U.S. at 604, 609 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 615–16, 631 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 20 (1989) (citing
Gibbons for the proposition that because the commerce power is plenary,
states ceded immunity in the plan of convention for claims arising out of obligations imposed by Congress under the commerce power).
232. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 752–53 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 424, for
the proposition that Congress cannot direct the states to accomplish federal
objectives); Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 849, 853–54 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch for the proposition that the people of the various states retained their separate political identities upon the ratification of the Constitution); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 533 (1988) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing McCulloch’s observation that “the power to tax involves the
power to destroy,” 17 U.S. at 431, for the proposition that “[f]ederal taxation of
state activities is inherently a threat to state sovereignty”); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 795 n.34 (1982) (citing McCulloch,
17 U.S. at 316, for the proposition that Congress cannot direct the state legislatures to act); Hall, 440 U.S. at 433–34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
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McCulloch itself suggested that because the constitutional
structure itself protects States, judicial protections are unnecessary.233 The dissenters, in contrast, cited McCulloch for the
propositions that the federal government enjoys broad incidental powers234 and that there are implied limits on state authority.235 The dissenters also consistently relied on statements in
McCulloch and Gibbons236 that the only restraints on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce inhere in the political process.237 Similarly, the dissenters cited Cohens and
Martin to support more general notions of federal supremacy.238
McCulloch for the proposition that when the Constitution is silent on an issue,
the Court should look to the “constitutional plan” to determine questions of
federalism; and later concluding that States have constitutional immunity
from state-law suits in other states’ courts); cf. Alden, 527 U.S. at 753 (citing
Osborn for the proposition that there are limits to Congress’s power to pursue
federal objectives through the state courts).
One notable exception is Justice Kennedy’s reliance on McCulloch in his
concurring opinion in Term Limits, in which he rejected the argument that because the states ratified the Constitution, the people can delegate power only
through the states or by acting in their capacities as citizens of particular
states. See 514 U.S. at 840–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting McCulloch,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403). In Term Limits, of course, Justice Kennedy joined
the frequent dissenters to create a new federalism majority.
233. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 435–36.
234. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 942 nn.1–2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress can compel state officials to administer a federal regulatory
program; citing McCulloch’s broad definition of Congress’s incidental authority); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 859, 861–62 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405–06).
235. See infra notes 244–49 and accompanying text.
236. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (“The wisdom
and the discretion of [C]ongress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many
other instances . . . the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure
them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often
rely solely, in all representative governments.”); McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 435–36
(explaining why the States should not be immune from federal taxation even
though the federal government is immune from state taxation).
237. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 648–49 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197); Baker, 485 U.S. at 519 (citing
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 435–36); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 435); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 754 n.18 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196); Hodel v.
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276, 290 (1981) (citing
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196); Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 857, 866–87 n.7,
878 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197, and McCulloch,
17 U.S. at 405–06); cf. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 822 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S.
at 428–29, for the theory of national popular sovereignty).
238. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
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c. Cases Addressing Limits on State Authority
The Justices also offered starkly different accounts of the
implications of Marshall Court decisions for the scope of the
States’ power. The Justices of the federalism majority generally
cited narrowing language in Marshall Court decisions to argue
against limitations on state power. The dissenters, in contrast,
robustly cited Marshall Court decisions to argue that the constitutional text and structure impose meaningful limits on
States’ authority.
The difference is most starkly apparent in the dueling
opinions in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,239 in which Justice Kennedy joined the four conventional dissenters in invalidating Arkansas’s attempt to impose term limits on federal
representatives.240 Justice Thomas’s dissent is representative of
the conventional federalism majority’s treatment of decisions of
the Marshall Court with respect to limitations on state authority. Justice Thomas’s premise was that the “ultimate source of
the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each
individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people
of the Nation as a whole.”241 He cited McCulloch for support,
quoting Chief Justice Marshall’s comment that “[n]o political
dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the
lines which separate the States, and of compounding the
American people into one common mass.”242 Justice Thomas,
527 U.S. 627, 660 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen there is a conflict
between a State’s interest and a federal right, it ‘would be hazarding too much
to assert, that the judicatures of the states will be exempt from the prejudices
by which the legislatures and people are influenced, and will constitute perfectly impartial tribunals.’” (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 386 (1821))); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 120 (1996) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (same); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548 (“[T]he sovereignty of the States
is limited by the Constitution itself. . . . [F]or example, . . . [b]y providing for
final review of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails the
sovereign power of the States’ judiciaries to make authoritative determinations of law.” (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816))); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 760–61 (rejecting the
conclusion that “would allow the States to disregard . . . the preeminent position held by federal law throughout the Nation . . . .” (citing Martin, 14 U.S. at
340–41)).
239. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
240. Id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 849 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403); see also id.
at 853 (“McCulloch seemed to assume that the people had ‘conferred on the
general government the power contained in the [C]onstitution, and on the
States the whole residuum of power.’” (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
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however, rejected the more broadly nationalistic implications of
the full passage in McCulloch from which the quote was
drawn.243
In contrast, Justice Stevens’s opinion in Term Limits relied
heavily on McCulloch for the proposition that the Constitution
imposes implied limits on state authority. He argued that
McCulloch demonstrates that the States’ reserved powers do
not extend to those powers that the States never enjoyed, such
as the power to create qualifications for federal representatives.244 More important, Justice Stevens’s opinion relied on
McCulloch for a conception of national popular sovereignty:
“The Congress of the United States . . . is not a confederation of
nations in which separate sovereigns are represented by appointed delegates, but is instead a body composed of representatives of the people.”245 For support, Justice Stevens quoted
Marshall’s statement in McCulloch that “[t]he government of
the Union . . . is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the
people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its
powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on
them, and for their benefit.”246
at 410)); cf. id. at 871 (citing Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249 (1833), which held that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause did not apply to the states, for the proposition that “one should not
lightly read [constitutional] provisions . . . as implicit deprivations of state
power”).
243. Id. at 849 n.2. The full passage in McCulloch, which Justice Kennedy
cited in his concurrence, id. at 840–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring), provides:
The Convention which framed the [C]onstitution was indeed elected
by the State legislatures. But the instrument . . . was submitted to
the people. . . . It is true, they assembled in their several States—and
where else should they have assembled? No political dreamer was
ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate
the States, and of compounding the American people into one common
mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But the
measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures
of the people themselves, or become the measures of the State governments.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403.
244. See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 796 n.12 (majority opinion) (explaining
that McCulloch rejected the argument that the Constitution’s silence on the
subject of state power to tax corporations chartered by Congress implies that
the states have “reserved” power to tax such federal instrumentalities (citing
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 430)).
245. Id. at 821.
246. Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404–05). Similarly, Justice Stevens
relied on McCulloch in arguing that permitting states to impose term limits on
federal representatives would “undermin[e] the uniformity and the national
character that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure,” and “sever the
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This pattern largely held in preemption and dormant Commerce Clause cases, as well. Although the voting blocs did not
always form as neatly in these categories of cases,247 in general
the Justices of the federalism majority cited narrow language
in Marshall Court decisions that suggest solicitude for state
autonomy.248 Conversely, the dissenters cited the more nationalistic implications of Gibbons and other Marshall Court decisions.249
III. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ORIGINALISM
A. THE ORIGINALIST’S DILEMMA
In one sense, the demonstrable difference in the way that
the Justices in the federalism majority and those in the federalism dissent treated decisions of the Marshall Court is entirely
unsurprising. After all, the Court routinely divided 5-4 in fed-

direct link that the Framers found so critical between the National Government and the people of the United States.” 514 U.S. at 822 (“Those means are
not given by the people of a particular State, not given by the constituents of
the legislature, . . . but by the people of all the States. They are given by all,
for the benefit of all—and upon theory, should be subjected to that government
only which belongs to all.” (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 428–29)).
247. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987)
(Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Brennan, Marshall, O’Connor, JJ.
and joined in part by Scalia, J.) (upholding state regulation of corporate stock
against preemption challenge).
248. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 613, 635 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (relying on Wilson v. BlackBird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829), and Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), in arguing that dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine is not an exclusive limitation of state autonomy); CTS Corp.,
481 U.S. at 89 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819), for the proposition that corporations are creatures of
state law); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 340 n.3 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) to support his
argument that the Court should reject a Commerce Clause challenge to a
state’s prohibition on sales of minnows out of state).
249. See, e.g., Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 571 (citing Justice Johnson’s
concurrence in Gibbons for the proposition that commerce must be “free from
all invidious and partial restraints,” 22 U.S. at 231); W. Lynn Creamery Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 202 (1994) (citing Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419 (1827) as having an expansive view of the dormant Commerce
Clause because it concluded that a burden placed at any point on the stream of
commerce will result in a disadvantage to the out-of-state producer); Hughes,
441 U.S. at 326 & n.3 (Brennan, J.) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 209, and Wilson, 27 U.S. at 245, as support for robust limitations on state regulation of
commerce).
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eralism cases.250 One would expect to find that the competing
positions were informed by competing views of the original
source material, including precedent. Viewed in the context of
originalism, however, the difference in treatment of Marshall
Court decisions suggests much more.
In light of the original understanding of how constitutional
ambiguities would be resolved, the Marshall Court’s nationalistic interpretations of the Constitution pose a potential dilemma
for the modern originalist—or at least for the modern originalist whose view of the original understanding relies heavily on
the ratification-era statements of Anti-Federalists. As I demonstrated recently, the Justices of the federalism majority regularly cited Anti-Federalist concerns about the meaning of the
Constitution in order to demonstrate that the delegates at the
state ratification conventions would never have voted to ratify
the Constitution unless it accommodated those concerns.251
These Justices implicitly argued that “although the AntiFederalists lost the war over whether the Constitution should
be ratified, there is no reason to think that the Anti-Federalists
lost every specific battle over how the various provisions of the
Constitution should be understood.”252 Accordingly, these Justices cited Anti-Federalist views to demonstrate that AntiFederalist hopes, and not fears, were realized upon ratification.253
The modern originalist who believes that Anti-Federalist
views deserve equal time in the quest to determine the original
understanding might, at least at first blush, be inclined to discount the decisions of the Marshall Court. Decisions of the
Marshall Court systematically ignored, at least implicitly in the
course of their reasoning, the ratification-era views of the AntiFederalists. Indeed, Jeffersonian Republicans—the ideological
heirs of the Anti-Federalists—reacted with revulsion to many
of the Marshall Court’s most important federalism decisions,
denouncing them as unwarranted extensions of federal authority or impermissible limitations on state authority.254
250. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
251. See Smith, supra note 18, at 259–62; see also, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 718–19, 724–25 (1999); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483 (1987); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 568 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
252. Smith, supra note 18, at 259.
253. See id. at 259–62.
254. “The Judiciary of the United States,” Jefferson wrote, “is the subtle
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Yet the modern originalist seems, even putting aside for a
moment the doctrine of stare decisis, to be bound by originalism
itself to accept the decisions of the Marshall Court, at least to
the extent that they addressed questions that were left “obscure and equivocal”255 upon ratification of the Constitution.
The original understanding appears to have been that the answers to questions left unresolved by the Constitution, or not
anticipated at the time of ratification, would be fixed in the
course of subsequent adjudications. According to the original
understanding, the Marshall Court’s resolution of such questions created fixed meaning where the original understanding
was ambiguous, meaning by which the modern originalist is
bound.
Of course, an originalist who believes that the Constitution
was not originally understood to confer broad power on the federal government can discount the nationalistic decisions of the
Marshall Court on the ground that they are simply inconsistent
with the original understanding.256 But to do so, the originalist
must be able to assert that the questions resolved by the Marshall Court were in fact not left “obscure and equivocal”257 by
the Constitution, and that the Marshall Court simply answered
them wrongly.258 The originalist who takes this view might still
choose, as a matter of stare decisis, to follow decisions of the
Marshall Court, but might not feel compelled to do so by
originalism itself.259
It is difficult even for the most confident originalist, however, to argue that the historical record provides clear answers
to all of the contentious questions addressed by the Marshall
Court, let alone that the Marshall Court answered them incorrectly. And the original understanding appears to demand the
conclusion that the answers to those questions were fixed by
the Marshall Court’s decisions, even though the questions
might have been resolved differently if the Chief Justice had
corps of sappers and miners constantly working underground to undermine
the foundations of our confederated fabric. They are construing our [C]onstitution from a coordination of a general and special government to a general and
supreme one alone.” NEWMYER, supra note 128, at 322. Jefferson summed up
the prevailing view among his party’s faithful when he remarked, “Nothing
should be spared to eradicate this spirit of Marshallism.” Id. at 146.
255. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229.
256. See Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 861.
257. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 229.
258. See Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 861–62.
259. See Scalia, Response, supra note 108, at 139–40.
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been less nationalistic than John Marshall. Even the originalist
who is skeptical of broad federal power thus may be compelled
by originalism itself to accept the expansively nationalistic decisions of the Marshall Court.
The results of the study presented above suggest that the
Justices in the federalism majority tended to follow what they
discerned to be the original understanding, rather than the
more expansive nationalistic implications of the Marshall
Court’s decisions. The Justices in the federalism dissent, in
contrast, treated decisions of the Marshall Court—including
their nationalistic implications—as having established constitutional meaning. In other words, the Justices in the majority
reacted to the dilemma by preferring their own account of the
original understanding to that of the Marshall Court. In contrast, the Justices in the dissent did not face a dilemma, because they treated the Marshall Court’s views and the original
understanding as one and the same.
B. CONSEQUENCES
What consequences for originalism follow from the majority’s and the dissent’s differential treatment of decisions of the
Marshall Court? First, the results of the study presented above
demonstrate that the Justices, while professing fidelity to the
principles of originalism, did not robustly, or at least consistently, adhere to the original understanding of how constitutional ambiguities would attain fixed meaning through adjudication. Second and more important, the study suggests that one
of the principal justifications for originalism—that it will constrain the discretion of judges to impose their own views in the
course of decision making—might not be accurate as a descriptive matter. By relying, explicitly or implicitly, on the vague
distinction between holdings and dicta to temper (or invigorate)
the doctrine of constitutional ambiguities, a Justice can ignore
(or accept) pronouncements of the Marshall Court according to
how well they correspond to the Justice’s own conception of the
original understanding or to the Justice’s own instrumentalist
goals.
Before elaborating on these themes, a few preliminary
thoughts are in order. I do not insist that the Marshall Court
correctly answered every question that it addressed, either as a
matter of the original understanding or according to some other
methodology of constitutional interpretation. Nor do I insist
that the Justices on the Rehnquist Court expressly or consis-
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tently professed fidelity to the account provided above of the
original understanding of how constitutional ambiguities would
be resolved, although other proponents of originalism have.260
Furthermore, I do not claim that the Court ought to adhere
particularly closely to the decisions (and the reasoning) of the
Marshall Court simply because Madison and others apparently
believed that the Court would play a special role in fixing the
meaning of ambiguous constitutional provisions. What is important for present purposes is that all of the Justices appeared
to accept some form of originalism as the appropriate constitutional methodology in federalism cases. To the extent that they
professed fidelity to a relatively strict version of originalism,261
the Justices’ own constitutional methodology required adherence to all original understandings. Originalism in its strict
form does not condone following the original understanding
with respect to some matters and not with respect to others;
the originalist must take the bitter with the sweet. In light of
the original understanding of how constitutional ambiguities
would be resolved, the Justices’ treatment of Marshall Court
decisions tells us something about their fidelity to originalism,
and about originalism itself.

260. See Nelson, supra note 6. At a minimum, the Justices who frequently
dissent in federalism cases do not accept the theory of liquidation in cases addressing the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, choosing instead a
nonoriginalist approach to construing its meaning. Compare United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that exclusion of women from a public
military academy violates the Fourteenth Amendment), with RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 20–245 (2d ed. 1977) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment as originally understood does not prohibit gender classifications). The Justices of the majority have not explicitly embraced the theory
either, although Justice Scalia recently offered something like Madison’s theory of liquidation as a guide for interpreting the scope of Congress’s power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
862–64 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declining to adhere to the Court’s twentieth-century decisions expansively construing Congress’s Section 5 power in
contexts other than racial discrimination, with respect to which the Court
gave the provision a “more expansive scope . . . from the beginning” (citing
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873)).
261. “According to the strict form of originalism, the Constitution derives
its authority from its ratification during particular periods in American history. Under this view, any departure from the understandings of those discrete periods robs constitutional interpretation of its claim to legitimacy.”
Dorf, supra note 30, at 1766. Dorf argues that Raoul Berger is the strictest
originalist among originalism’s prominent proponents, and he cites Justice
Scalia’s writings, as well. See id. at 1766 nn.2 & 3.

P_SMITH_3FMT

2006]

01/23/2006 04:17:18 PM

THE ORIGINALIST’S DILEMMA

667

1. Fidelity to the Original Understanding of How
Constitutional Ambiguities Would Be Resolved
Proponents and opponents of the ratification agreed that
questions left ambiguous by the Constitution would attain fixed
meaning through the process of construction. Madison, Hamilton, Brutus, and the others who offered this view appeared to
have had in mind something more than simply importing to
constitutional adjudication the doctrine of stare decisis. That
doctrine, after all, permits a Court to overrule prior precedent
after considering a “series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior
decision with the ideal of the rule of law.”262 In the Framers’
view, however, constitutional meaning, once resolved, would
remain fixed, subject only to the amendment process.263 Even to
the extent that the Framers envisioned that judicial constructions of the Constitution would be subject to ongoing revision
according to the common-law method of adjudication, they do
not appear to have anticipated significant evolution of constitutional meaning over time.264
In practice, however, the Court has, from its very earliest
days, treated decisions addressing constitutional meaning as
subject to judicial revision. Indeed, the Court has often made
clear that it will not adhere to stare decisis as rigidly in cases
involving constitutional interpretation, because, unlike decisions involving statutory interpretation, Congress is not free to
alter the Court’s constitutional decisions.265 Marshall himself is
notorious for his general hostility to precedent,266 although of
course there was much less of it when he wrote his opinions for
the Court. More important, the Court has not always followed
strict originalism in determining constitutional meaning, and
262. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).
263. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 60, at 160 (remarks of Edmund Randolph
at the Virginia Ratifying Convention) (acknowledging that the Necessary and
Proper Clause is ambiguous and that the “ambiguity may injure the states,”
but arguing that if the ambiguities are not properly “explain[ed]” by Congress,
then “the states can combine in order to insist on amending the ambiguities”);
Nelson, supra note 6, at 526–47 (discussing the notion of “fixed meaning”).
264. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 77, at 514 (remarks of Rep. James
Madison, June 17, 1789) (stating that the determination of the scope of the
President’s power to remove an executive officer “will become the permanent
exposition of the Constitution”).
265. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73
(1989).
266. See CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 196.
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thus has not always faithfully adhered to the original theory of
how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved.267
Today, however, originalism is ascendant on the Court, at
least in federalism cases. One would expect to find that
originalist Justices follow not only the original understanding
of constitutional provisions, but also the original understanding
of the manner in which constitutional ambiguities would be resolved.268 Accordingly, one would also expect to find that the
most faithful originalist Justices hew most closely to the Marshall Court’s pronouncements on the scope of federal and state
power. After all, the Marshall Court offered the first constructions of some of the most important questions left unresolved
by the text of the Constitution.
This has not been the case. As the discussion above demonstrates,269 the Justices who most often sided with the States in
federalism disputes were substantially more likely than the

267. Marshall’s participation in the ratification debates almost certainly
informed his decisions for the Court. Although his approach to constitutional
interpretation was generally consistent with modern originalism, Friedman &
Smith, supra note 29, at 11 & n. 25, his decisions rarely phrased the inquiry in
those terms. Originalism formally came under attack around the time of the
Civil War and in the years that followed it, as the Court construed the Civil
War Amendments and their affect on the balance between federal and state
authority. See SYDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 55
(photo reprint 1969) (1862); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 150 (1890). Originalism and the notion
that the Constitution’s meaning could evolve competed for the Court’s devotion
during the period between Reconstruction and the New Deal. Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936), and Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (originalist), with Home
Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), and Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (nonoriginalist). After the New Deal, critics alternately accused the Warren Court of ignoring the original meaning of the Constitution, see, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,
54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 703 (1976), and of relying on it but misapplying it, see,
e.g., Kelly, supra note 36, at 136–37, and the Warren Court’s perceived excesses led to the rise of the modern originalists.
268. Indeed, originalists have relied on Madison’s theory of liquidation to
reconcile originalism with the reality of the Constitution’s indeterminacy. See
supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text; Nelson, supra note 6, at 523–39.
The account offered here of the original understanding of how constitutional
ambiguities would be resolved also helps to explain why stare decisis is not
inconsistent with originalism. In any event, prominent originalists accept the
doctrine of stare decisis as an established, and perhaps necessary, feature of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Scalia, Response, supra note 108, at
138–39; Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16, at 861 (“[A]lmost every originalist
would adulterate [originalism] with the doctrine of stare decisis . . . .”).
269. See supra Part II.B.2.
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dissenters to ignore federalism decisions of the Marshall Court
or to discount their more aggressively nationalistic implications. Among those Justices are the members of the Court who
were the most ardent proponents of originalism as a methodology of constitutional interpretation, including Justice Scalia,270
Justice Rehnquist,271 and Justice Thomas.272 For these originalists, the decisions of the Marshall Court apparently posed a dilemma: either discount the significance of Marshall Court opinions in order to declare an original understanding that is more
solicitous of the views of framing-era opponents of the Constitution, or accept the nationalist implications of Marshall Court
decisions, thus remaining faithful to the original understanding
of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved. The former choice risks infidelity to the original understanding of how
constitutional ambiguities would be resolved, while the latter
risks undervaluing the views of Anti-Federalists in the quest to
define the original understanding. The results of the study presented here suggest that these Justices chose the former path.
It would be too strong to suggest that these Justices in effect were unfaithful to originalism—specifically, to the original
understanding of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved—by declining to accord dispositive weight to decisions of
the Marshall Court. After all, all of the Justices of the federalism majority appeared to accept the core holdings of most Marshall decisions. Arguably, the Madisonian theory of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved requires adherence only
to holdings, which, according to the Anglo-American tradition,
are the only judicial determinations that have binding force—
and thus “fix” meaning. Dicta has never been binding, either as
a matter of stare decisis or according to Madison’s theory of
how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved. If it were, instrumentalist judges would regularly reach out to decide issues
that are not necessary to the resolution of the cases before
them. Because many of Marshall’s most expansive constructions of federal power were dicta, the modern originalist can
270. See, e.g., Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 17; Scalia, Originalism, supra note 16.
271. See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 267.
272. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (urging a “return to an interpretation [of the Commerce Clause]
better rooted in the Clause’s original understanding”); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (urging abandonment of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
and fidelity to original understanding).
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contend that those constructions may be safely ignored—if in
fact they otherwise seem inconsistent with the original understanding, constitutional structure, or some other source of constitutional meaning—while maintaining fidelity to the original
understanding of how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved.
Yet this account of the federalism majority’s treatment of
decisions of the Marshall Court is unsatisfying, for several reasons. First, as explained above, the distinction between holdings and dicta is notoriously indeterminate.273 Permitting
judges to ignore, based on this distinction, important pronouncements about constitutional meaning by a Court with a
historically close vantage point on the original understanding
invites the very type of instrumentalist decision making that
proponents of originalism claim the methodology is likely to
prevent. As Professor Dorf explained, “a too-narrow view of
holdings often serves as a means by which judges evade precedents that cannot fairly be distinguished.”274 A judge who disagrees with the substantive implications of a relevant statement in a Marshall Court decision can easily insist that the
statement is mere dicta and decline to follow it purely on instrumentalist grounds.
Second, this account ignores the role that Marshall Court
decisions played in the early Republic. Marshall may well have
“seldom missed the opportunity to rest a decision on two or
three grounds when one would have sufficed, . . . to pick the
more difficult ground for decision, . . . or to pass on issues not
necessarily presented . . . .”275 But given the political and legal
context in which he operated, as well as his uncanny ability to
gauge in advance the limits of what would be politically acceptable, his decisions effectively answered many more questions
than simply those narrowly presented. The political and legal
culture generally responded by treating those questions as having been answered. Indeed, as Neal Katyal has argued, dicta
often serves the role of “advicegiving” to political branches;276
although they need not follow it, it can be influential in setting
expectations about what is constitutionally acceptable. This
was particularly true during Marshall’s tenure on the Court
273. See supra notes 111–19 and accompanying text.
274. Dorf, supra note 112, at 1999.
275. CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 197.
276. Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 109,
1801 (1998).
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because so many fundamental questions about the separation
of powers—both horizontal and vertical—were still unresolved
or disputed, and even Marshall’s contemporaneous detractors
often recognized that his dicta had special force.
After the decision in Cohens, for example, Jefferson wrote a
letter to Justice William Johnson and James Madison complaining about Marshall’s view of federalism and of the power
of the Court.277 Jefferson suggested that disputes between a
State and the federal government should be resolved by an appeal to an “ultimate arbiter [of] the people of the Union, assembled by their deputies in convention, at the call of Congress, or
of two-thirds of the States.”278 Madison, who had been sympathetic to Jefferson’s views since at least the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions,279 made clear in his response that he agreed
with Jefferson’s view of Marshall’s tenure.280 He complained
that the “Judiciary career has not corresponded with what was
anticipated,” particularly in light of the Marshall Court’s “propensity to enlarge the general authority in derogation of the local, and to amplify its own jurisdiction” through “extrajudicial
reasons [and] dicta.”281 Madison disagreed with Jefferson’s proposed solution, however, suggesting instead that if any remedy
were necessary, a constitutional amendment would make more
sense.282 Madison, in other words, was prepared to accept that
Marshall’s expansive constructions of the Constitution—even
those announced “extrajudicial[ly]” or via dicta—effectively
fixed the meaning of the Constitution, and were correctable
only through the amendment process.283

277. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (June 12,
1823), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1469, 1472–77 (Merrill D.
Peterson ed., 1984).
278. Id. at 1476.
279. See supra note 127.
280. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), reprinted in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 798, 798–802 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
1999).
281. Id. at 802; see also THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 358 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981) (noting
that Madison bemoaned Marshall’s “latitudinary mode of expounding the Constitution” in McCulloch v. Maryland).
282. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 280, at
802.
283. See NEWMYER, supra note 128, at 325 (stating that Madison had come
to believe that “disputed constitutional interpretation on major issues should
be settled by constitutional amendment, not judicial decisions”).
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Similarly, the decision in McCulloch did much more than
simply hold that Congress had power to create a national bank,
that Congress’s incidental powers under the Necessary and
Proper Clause are broad, and that the States lack power to tax
an instrumentality of the federal government, although these
three holdings alone had explosive implications for federalstate relations. Marshall’s decision in McCulloch also embraced
a conception of national popular sovereignty,284 and in the process validated the conception of federal power that Hamilton
had offered over Jefferson’s objection two decades earlier.285
This is not to suggest that all of John Marshall’s pronouncements immediately fixed the Constitution’s meaning.
Marshall himself did not always feel bound by his prior pronouncements,286 and he offered the classic statement of why
dicta should not bind future courts.287 But it is to suggest that
the Marshall Court’s decisions are entitled to substantial deference. The Marshall Court had the occasion to address thorny
questions of first impression about the respective powers of the
federal and state governments—and, unlike on later Courts,
“the Justices’ own memories bridged the temporal distance between the Founding and the case at hand.”288 Indeed, outside of
the federalism context, the Court has long treated Marshall
dicta as authoritative. For example, Marbury stands today for
much more than its holdings about the constitutionality of the
Judiciary Act, the scope of Article III’s original jurisdiction provision, and the Court’s power of judicial review. The Court has
repeatedly cited it for the proposition that where there is a
right there is a remedy,289 even though the Court’s statement—
the government will “cease to deserve” the “high appellation” of
a “government of laws, and not of men,” if “the laws furnish no

284. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819)
(“Those powers are not given by the people of a single state. They are given by
the people of the United States, to a government whose laws, made in pursuance of the [C]onstitution, are declared to be supreme. Consequently, the people of a single state cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend over
them.”).
285. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text.
286. See CURRIE, SUPREME COURT, supra note 7, at 196 (“His disdain for
precedent in general was extraordinary, even when it squarely supported
him . . . .”).
287. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
288. Friedman & Smith, supra note 29, at 11.
289. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66
(1992); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
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remedy for the violation of a vested legal right”290—was dicta
under any definition of the term.291
Third, contending that the Justices in the majority justifiably ignored only dicta rings hollow when one considers that
they occasionally gave substantial deference to dicta from Marshall Court federalism decisions. Such deference was applied
when the dicta tended to buttress the account of the original
understanding that the Justices otherwise sought to defend.
For example, in United States v. Morrison, in asserting that
Congress largely lacks power to regulate and punish “interstate
violence,” Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court relied
on Marshall’s statement in Cohens v. Virginia that Congress
has “no general right to punish murder committed within any
of the States” or to “punish felonies generally.”292 The Justices
in the federalism majority declined to rely on Cohens’s pronouncements about the scope of the States’ sovereign immunity, however, on the ground that they are “dicta.”293 Similarly,
the majority regularly cited Marshall’s statements in Gibbons
v. Ogden and McCulloch v. Maryland that Congress’s powers
are limited by the enumeration,294 even though the majority
declined to rely on Marshall’s broader statements in those decisions about the scope of federal authority.295 The majority also
290. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
291. Marshall’s statements about the rule of law were not necessary to the
decision in Marbury in light of the Court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the suit. Id. at 173, 180. The statements also were not part of the rationale of the holding about the Court’s jurisdiction. See Dorf, supra note 112,
at 2005–09, 2040–48 (discussing different definitions of dicta, including the
facts-and-outcomes definition and the rationale-based definition).
292. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (quoting Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 426, 428 (1821)). These statements are
dicta both under the facts-and-outcomes approach and the rationale-focused
approach. See supra notes 110–19 and accompanying text. The Court held that
it had jurisdiction because an Act of Congress authorizing the government in
the District of Columbia was a “law[ ] of the United States” within the meaning of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 436. The Court made its
comments about Congress’s power in the course of addressing the hypothetical
question whether Congress had authority to pass laws that operate outside of
the District of Columbia; although the Court suggested that Congress has
such authority if it is “necessary to complete and effectuate execution,” it did
not have to resolve the question, in light of its conclusion that Congress had
not in fact attempted to authorize the sale of lottery tickets in Virginia. Id. at
423–30, 440–48.
293. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,. 482
n.11 (1987); see supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553, 566 (1995).
295. See supra notes 225–31 and accompanying text.
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cited, with much greater frequency than the dissent, dicta from
decisions of the Taney and Chase Courts, which were more solicitous of claims of States’ rights, to support an originalist account favoring state autonomy.296
Fourth, in discerning the original understanding, the Court
gave deference to acts (or inaction) of the earliest Congresses,
both according to the theory of liquidation of constitutional ambiguities and because many of the members of the early Congresses were Framers themselves. As Justice Scalia explained,
not only do “early congressional enactments ‘provid[e] contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution’s meaning,’”297 but “such contemporaneous legislative exposition of the
Constitution . . . , acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes
the construction to be given its provisions.’”298 Although Marshall was not the first Chief Justice and not all of his colleagues
during his long tenure on the Court had participated directly in
the framing and ratification of the Constitution, Marshall was
a central figure at the Virginia ratification convention, and his
Court’s decisions, like those of the early Congresses, reflect the
accumulated wisdom of the framing era. Accordingly, dicta in
Marshall Court decisions are perhaps entitled to greater weight
than dicta from other courts.
2. Originalism’s Judicial-Constraint Defense
The majority’s and the dissent’s differential treatment of
decisions of the Marshall Court together undermine one of the
principal justifications for originalism. Proponents argue that
originalism is the most effective interpretive methodology at
constraining the discretion of judges to impose their own views
in the course of decision making.299 According to the judicialconstraint defense, because originalism, unlike other approaches that treat constitutional meaning as subject to evolving, extra-textual norms, fixes the meaning of a constitutional
provision according to the original understanding of that provi296. My data shows that the Justices in the federalism majority are about
four times more likely than the dissenting Justices to cite cases—and particularly pro-states’ rights dicta in cases—such as Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 527 (1858), Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868), Lane County v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868), and Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
113 (1870).
297. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (quoting Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1986) (alteration in original)).
298. Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926)).
299. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
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sion, judges cannot impose their own views under the guise of
constitutional interpretation. The substantial difference between the majority’s and the dissent’s treatment of decisions of
the Marshall Court suggests, however, either that the theory of
how constitutional ambiguities would be resolved is inherently
malleable or that originalism in fact has not constrained the
ability of the Justices to decide federalism cases based on their
own (albeit genuinely held) normative views of the appropriate
balance of federal and state authority.
As explained above, the originalist can justify the decision
to discount decisions of the Marshall Court by relying on the
distinction between holdings and dicta. But this justification
not only casts doubt on whether the Court is being faithful to
the Framers’ understanding of how ambiguous constitutional
provisions would attain fixed meaning, but also suggests that
the judicial-constraint defense of originalism is overstated. The
study demonstrates that there is a substantial risk that a Justice will decide whether to follow pronouncements of the Marshall Court according to how well they correspond to the Justice’s own conception of the original understanding or to the
Justice’s own instrumentalist goals.
I do not mean to suggest that the Justices in the majority
or the dissent did in fact decide whether to ignore, discount, or
embrace pronouncements of the Marshall Court as part of an
instrumentalist attempt to advance their personal views of the
appropriate balance between federal and state power.300 But
the results of the study need only be consistent with such an account to undermine the judicial constraint defense of originalism. The Justices’ differential treatment of decisions of the
Marshall Court demonstrates that judges have vast discretion
in choosing which sources to rely on when reconstructing the
300. Others, however, have leveled a similar charge, at least against the
majority. See Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution’s Forgotten Cover Letter: An
Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 615, 645 (1995) (“In essence, the New Federalists seem to view the Constitution almost as if it was a compromise between those who drafted it and
their opponents.”); Jackson, supra note 205, at 318–24 (wondering “whether
the early 19th century vision of the Marshall Court does not commend itself
more to the world of today than does the vision of federal judicial power recently advanced in the Rehnquist Court”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest
Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 675–81 (1993) (arguing
that Justice O’Connor’s view of federalism in New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992), parallels the decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals in
Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1815), which was reversed by Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee).
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original understanding, and thus suggests that originalism’s
advantage over other approaches to constitutional interpretation in its ability to constrain judicial discretion is marginal.
To be sure, it may be the case that a theoretically principled application of originalism not only permits but requires
that the court be free from the constraint of precedent at least
to some degree. That is, even if one does not accept Lawson’s
view that a court always must prefer the original understanding to a prior judicial decision inconsistent with that understanding,301 one might argue that fidelity to the original understanding at least permits a court to depart from precedent that
lacks a foundation in the original understanding. This view
might justify the federalism majority’s choice to ignore Marshall Court decisions construing the extent of the States’ constitutional immunity from suit. But even on this view, it is far
from clear that originalism would be particularly effective at
curbing instrumentalism, let alone at promoting the values of
consistency and stability in the law. Permitting judges to ignore precedents that they deem sufficiently inconsistent with
their understanding of the original understanding would appear, if anything, to invite judicial instrumentalism, not to
limit it.
This is also not to suggest that other methodologies for interpreting the Constitution are more effective than originalism
at constraining judicial instrumentalism. But neither is
originalism the panacea for instrumentalism that its proponents often claim, and the study presented here suggests that
those claims should not, alone, stand in the way of the development of other defensible interpretive methodologies.
CONCLUSION
On the 200th anniversary of the appointment of John Marshall as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist gave a speech in which he praised Marshall as a
“splendid gift” to the American people.302 Rehnquist praised
Marshall’s success, which he achieved even though he “faced a
built-in headwind against his views for the first twenty-four
years of his tenure as Chief Justice” because Presidents Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe “had quite a different view of the re301. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
302. See William H. Rehnquist, Remarks (May 8, 2001), http://www
.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-08-01.html.
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lationship between the federal and state governments than
Marshall did.”303 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s federalism decisions—and those of the voting bloc he led—do not, however,
demonstrate quite the same level of fondness for decisions of
the Marshall Court.
John Marshall may often have gotten it wrong, and he is
certainly not above the charge that he was an instrumentalist
Justice, taking every opportunity to fix constitutional meaning
according to his view of the appropriate balance between federal and authority. But the modern originalist—even the
originalist who does not generally share Marshall’s view of the
original understanding—ought to take the bitter with the
sweet. If the original understanding was that constitutional
ambiguities would attain fixed meaning in judicial decisions,
then the modern originalist appears bound by originalism to
accept some range of decisions of the Marshall Court, however
much they may have demonstrated a preference for federal supremacy over state autonomy. That many modern originalists
do not feel so bound—and that they may choose not to feel so
bound—suggests that originalism’s promise as a constraint on
judicial instrumentalism remains unfulfilled.

303. Id.

